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Abstract:
Robot manufacturers will be required to demonstrate objectively that all reasonably foreseeable 
hazards have been identified in any robotic product design that is to be marketed commercially. 
This is problematic for autonomous mobile robots because conventional methods, which have 
been developed for automatic systems do not assist safety analysts in identifying non-mission 
interactions with environmental features that are not directly associated with the robot’s design 
mission, and which may comprise the majority of the required tasks of autonomous robots.
In this paper we develop a new variant of preliminary hazard analysis that is explicitly aimed at 
identifying non-mission interactions by means of new sets of guidewords not normally found in 
existing variants. We develop the required features of the method and describe its application to 
several small trials conducted at Bristol Robotics Laboratory in the 2011-2012 period.
Keywords: hazard analysis, environmental survey, autonomous, mobile robot, safety
1 Introduction
As autonomous mobile robots become a commercial reality, attention must be paid to the problem 
of assuring their safety. In almost every application of mobile robots other than toys, the size, 
power or speed of robots will be such that potential hazards will be associated with their operation 
or malfunction. Legal regulations in most countries require that any such safety critical system be 
designed so as to reduce the risk of accidents caused by these hazards to less than some required 
threshold, or at least as low as is reasonably practicable.
The achievement of safety in engineering systems requires a combination of different approaches 
of safety requirements specification, analysis, design and manufacturing inspections, and product 
testing. The objective of these is to determine what hazards are associated with the system, to 
specify and implement features of the design that act to reduce the probability of an accident, and 
2then to confirm whether each product that is actually manufactured does indeed possess the 
intended properties when operating in its intended environment(s).
This paper presents the results of recent research performed by the authors at Bristol Robotics 
Laboratory (BRL) into methods of analysis of robotic systems for the identification of potential 
hazards associated with autonomous operation in diverse environments. Much of the work was 
carried out as a background activity to the European INTRO project (www.introbotics.eu), and 
some work as internal research and postgraduate projects solely within BRL. The results of the 
application of Hazard Analysis in INTRO research conducted in BRL is summarized in the work 
of Giannaccini, Sobhani et al. (2013). Several studies have been performed on different robotic 
applications, and lessons learned in early efforts have resulted in proposals for a new method, 
Environmental Surveys, which have then been applied in later trials. In this paper, we present the 
work that was performed, and draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the new method and 
ideas for future work that emerge from these studies.
1.1 The INTRO Project
INTRO (www.introbotics.eu) seeks to better understand issues in Human-Robot interaction and, 
ultimately, endow the robot with cognitive and physical intelligence sufficient to deal with 
complex situations and safety of typical interactions. The 4 year long, Initial Training Network 
project, sponsored by the European Commission*, has trained 8 young researchers to prepare them 
for careers in the fast developing area of service robotics. They explored various aspects of 
interactions - from learning by demonstration, intention and emotion recognition, to gesture 
analysis, intelligent interfaces and safety factors. The individual topics will be integrated into two 
different scenarios designed and developed by two post-doctoral researchers on the project 
employed by two European robotic companies – Space Applications (Belgium) and Robosoft 
(France). The two scenarios – Search and Rescue and Robot-waiter have been selected to be best 
to demonstrate what robots need to do in situations that require communication between humans 
and the robot and that are placed in noisy and dynamic environments.  In both cases, hazards and 
faults are inevitable.
1.2 Industry Safety Standards for Autonomous Robots
In addition to existing research into safety issues for mobile autonomous robots, BRL has also 
supported UK participation in the ISO TC184 SC2 (Robots and robotic devices) committee in its 
development of a new industry standard ISO 13482 (ISO/FDIS13482), which specifies safety 
requirements for (non-medical) personal care applications of service robots. These include 
domestic service robots, physical assistant robots (e.g. exoskeleton-type assistive robots or human 
load-sharing mobile robots) and person carrier robots (autonomous mobile passenger carts). The 
standard includes lists of hazards that are predicted to be commonly encountered, so standard 
levels of safety performance can be specified that can offer a baseline performance level which can 
be assessed and certified. ISO 13482 is due for public release in late-2013, and at time of writing is 
in its final draft stage. The work in this paper is intended to supplement the publication of the 
3standard by offering guidance on how to perform the hazard identification task for the kinds of 
robots covered by ISO 13482.
1.2 Structure of this Paper
In Section 2 of this paper we review existing work on the topic of hazard identification of 
autonomous mobile robots. In Section 3 of this paper, we present a review of current methods for 
functional hazard analysis, as developed in numerous existing (non-robotic) industry sectors. In 
Section 4 we present the initial hazard analysis study, and we discuss the problems facing the task 
of hazard identification for systems that operate autonomously in open environments, which led us 
to develop the new method of Environmental Surveys. In the Section 5 we present the new method 
and in Section 6 we present its initial trials. In Sections 7 and 8 we discuss the results and present 
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the work and how it should progress in the future.
2 Background
In this section we discuss the main safety issues associated with designing an autonomous service 
robot.
2.1 Safety of Autonomous Robotic Systems
Autonomous robots are a class of robot system which may have one or more of the following 
properties: adaptation to changes in the environment; planning for future events; learning new 
tasks; and making informed decisions without human intervention. Although commercially 
available autonomous robots are still few, Goodrich and Schultz (2007) report that there is 
increasing demand for both personal robots for the home and service robots for industry.
At present, much of the research into robotic safety is looking at improving design of safety 
mechanisms, for example collision avoidance (Kulic and Croft, 2003; Heinzmann and Zelinsky, 
2003) or fault detection and tolerance (Petterson, 2005), object manipulation (Grigore, Eder et al 
2013), or human contact safety (Haddadin, 2010). This has led researchers to suggest that safety of 
human-robot interaction requires both high-precision sensory information and fast reaction times, 
in order to work with and around humans (Giuliani et al., 2010; Kulic and Croft, 2007). Work by 
Alexander et al. (2009) suggests that for autonomous systems to support humans as peers, while 
maintaining safety, robot actions may need to be restricted, preventing optimum flexibility and 
performance. Other work in robotic safety focuses on risk quantification, for example Ikuta et al. 
(2003) and Haddadin (2009).
In contrast, our work is concerned with initial identification of hazards and their associated safety 
requirements. It is not concerned with risk assessment, or the design and implementation of safety 
mechanisms and fault detection such as the work described by Petterson (2005). The only work we 
are aware of, which is similar to this paper, is that of Guiochet et al. (2004, 2010) and Martin-
Guillerez et al. (2010) (see Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion).
One of the principle requirements for dependability in autonomous robots is robustness. This 
means being able to handle errors and to continue operation during abnormal conditions (Lussier 
et al., 2004). To achieve this it is important that the system should be able to support changes to its 
4task specification (Bonasso and Kortenkamp, 1996).  These changes are necessary as, in a dynamic 
environment, the robot will frequently find itself in a wide range of previously unseen situations.
While this is not a subject covered in this paper, our work does also lead us to similar conclusions 
– see Section 8.2.
It is clear from the literature that little research has been done on the day-to-day operation of 
personal robots, and all the safety risks associated with this. One reason why this may be the case, 
is that currently personal robots are only tested in `mock’ home conditions that have been heavily 
structured and the majority of real world hazards removed. Therefore there has been no need to 
conduct a survey of many of the real environments, in which personal robots may be required to 
operate. 
2.2 Results of Robot Studies using Hazard Analysis
One of the few research works for hazard analysis of service robots has been published by 
Guiochet et al. (2010). Their research considers the MIRAS RobuWalker, which is a robotic 
assistant for helping people stand up from a seated position and support them while walking. The 
RobuWalker can be used in two modes, a user controlled mode and an automation mode. The user 
controlled mode is used when the human is supported by the robot in a standing position. The 
automated mode is required when the human is in a seated position. This mode allows the user to 
request the robot to move from its stored position, which could be anywhere in the room, to the 
location where the human making the request is located. This involves the robot navigating the 
environment with no assistance from the user. Based on the hazard analysis results that have been 
published, it is clear that only hazards associated with the normal operation of the robot have been 
considered.  For example there are no hazards recorded associated with other non-task related 
entities that may be present in the robot’s operating area. This issue of not analysing hazards that 
are not directly associated with the robot’s task has also been identified in other projects.  A study 
by (Böhm and Gruber, 2010) examined a therapeutic robot for disabled children.  To analyse the 
safety of this device, the researchers used the hazard analysis technique HAZOP.  This method 
examined how the child and robot would interact and considered the potential safety risks. 
However, as with the previous example, no consideration is given to the types of hazard that the 
robot may encounter outside the predefined tasks.
The PHRIENDS project (Alami et al., 2006; Martin-Guillerez et al., 2010) performed hazard 
analysis on a wheel-based mobile robot with a manipulator arm that was designed to pick up and 
move objects around the environment. This robot, which was required to work collaboratively with 
a human user, was designed to safely navigate a dynamic environment that could contain multiple 
humans. This represents the largest scale hazard analysis of a personal robot found in the literature. 
Their analysis considered the safety risks of the robot from a number of positions, including the 
potential hazards of each major component of the robot failing, the risks associated with human 
users, and the types and severity of collisions that may occur.
As has been discussed in this paper, traditional hazard analysis methods for service robots can 
result in safety risks outside the normal operating scenarios being missed. To address this issue, 
research by Woodman et al. (2012) has proposed the use of a hazard analysis check list. This 
5check list highlights a number of environmental and user risks that need to be considered when 
assessing the risk of a personal robot. Although this research concludes that the check list cannot 
be shown to identify all the potential safety risks.
The following section presents the findings of the experiments conducted at the BRL, and 
discusses their implications for the safety analysis of service robots.
3 Hazard Identification Analysis
Hazard identification analysis (often referred to simply as ‘hazard identification’ or ‘hazard 
analysis’) is required as a safety assurance activity during the requirements specification and early 
design stages of any safety critical system (it is often required as a mandatory activity by industry 
safety standards). This section provides an overview of the subject, and discusses the issues that 
affect the analysis of autonomous mobile robots. 
3.1 Conventional Theory and Methodology
In most countries, national laws require that all reasonable steps be taken to ensure that products or 
processes sold to consumers or used in workplaces are safe as far as is reasonably practicable. 
Depending on the legal codes and practices of a given nation, the mandate for “reasonableness” is 
either written explicitly into legislation as in the UK Health & Safety at Work and Consumer 
Protection Acts (UK National Archives 1974, 1987) or it is implicit within the legal code as in
many other European countries (Eliot 2007). In either case, the result is the same – it is incumbent 
on manufacturers and employers to ensure that risks are reduced “so far as reasonably practicable 
(SFAIRP)” or “as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)” (these terms are synonymous, but the 
latter is more popular). It is generally considered, at least in the UK (Eliot 2007), that the risk of 
harm cannot be reduced as low as reasonably practicable unless the following can be shown 
objectively (i.e. without allowance for any personal qualities of a manufacturer, employer, or 
vendor):
 the harm was not foreseeable, 
 the safety measures taken were not reasonably practicable, or 
 the harm was outside the scope of the undertaking (manufacturers/employers are not liable for 
that which is outside the scope of their responsibility).
Of these three criteria, the first and third present particular challenges to developers of mobile 
autonomous robots, and are the ultimate objectives to which the methods proposed in this paper 
are dedicated.
In order to satisfy these criteria, engineers perform a variety of safety assurance tasks during the 
design of a safety critical system. Methods and processes for safety-directed design and testing are 
outside the scope of this paper, but safety assurance also includes a number of procedures to 
identify potential sources of harm, and for delineating the scope of consideration to the boundaries 
of the manufacturer’s responsibility. These methods and procedures are generally referred to as 
hazard analysis or hazard identification.
63.1.1 Background on Hazard Identification
The hazard identification process is the start of the safety assurance process of any safety critical 
system. The general objective of hazard identification is to define all the possible hazards that 
might occur in a system throughout its operational life. However, the unbounded definition of the 
operational time and of the environment of a system means that it cannot be guaranteed formally
whether all possible hazards have been identified. So typical hazard analysis methods seek to try 
and provide a systematic classification of hazards, which can identify all the logical types of 
hazards but not all the specific instances of hazards (the events themselves), which safety 
assurance engineers must determine based on their knowledge and intuition. 
Hazard identification is first started at an early stage in the system development process, typically 
once the initial version of the system requirements specification is available. Hazard identification 
analysis done at this stage is often referred to as Preliminary Hazard Analysis or Identification 
(PHA or PHI), because it is often the case that the only design information available for analysis 
are the most abstract (high level) and basic functional requirements defining what the system is to 
do – details about the general nature of the actuation mechanisms or the interfaces between the 
system and its environment have not yet been specified. Later, as the general physical structure is 
defined and the details of the boundary interfaces are specified, the hazard analysis is often 
referred to as Functional or System Hazard Analysis (FHA or SHA).
3.1.2 Contemporary Hazard Identification Methodologies – a Review
A number of variants of preliminary and functional hazard identification methods have been 
developed over the years, often for different industrial sectors reflecting the particular 
technological domains, design practices, conventions and terminology. This section describes the 
general principles, and reviews some of the more widely used methods from different industry 
sectors.
Hazard Identification Analysis – General Principles
The aim of hazard analysis is to identify all plausible and reasonably foreseeable hazards 
associated with a system’s operation in its environment. For identification of functional hazards
this is typically achieved by two general approaches, which are canonical so their use is equivalent 
in functional terms.
The two approaches are based on two variations in the modelling of failures and their effects 
within system functional models, which are illustrated in Figure 1. In general, system functions are 
modelled as input/output processes encapsulated within the system’s boundary and interacting 
with the outside world via the system interface. Hazards arising from defects within the system can 
then be modelled by defining failure conditions of the elements of the system model, in the two 
respective viewpoints.
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System
System 
Function A
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
System interface
System
Failure of 
Function A
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
System functions 
(described by functional 
requirements) cause 
changes in the flows across 
the system boundary 
interface, which affects 
system behaviour.
System failure behaviour 
can be modelled by 
describing failure 
conditions in the operation 
of system functions.
System
Failure of 
Function A
Outputs
Inputs
Bi-directional Flows
Output error(s) due to failure of 
Function A
Input errors causing failure of 
Function A
Flow errors that are either a 
cause or an effect of a failure of 
Function A
Alternatively, system failure behaviour can be modelled (canonically) by describing 
boundary flow errors that cause or arise from failures of internal system functions.
Function-oriented View
Interface-oriented View
System Modelling
Figure 1: Canonical representations of failures typically used in hazard identification 
analysis.
The first approach – the function-oriented view- is to model failures as defects of the functional 
processes. The requirements of each system function are inspected, and fault or error conditions 
associated with each requirement are identified and assessed for their consequences on the external 
environment via the system interfaces. The hazard analysis builds up a classification table or 
diagram of system failure conditions on a function-by-function basis, with interface behaviour 
being a secondary description within each function-based classification category.
In contrast, the second approach – the interface-oriented view – models failure conditions at the 
boundary interface of the system. Fault or error conditions are identified for all the parameters that 
define the interface, and the consequences of each parameter failure on the performance of the 
8system functions is assessed for its consequences, and the hazard analysis table or diagram is built 
up in terms of system interfaces and the failure of their parameters.
With respect to system functional safety, the two approaches are canonical: a system failure cannot 
have any effect on safety unless it affects the way in which the system interacts with the outside 
environment. An internal fault or error that causes no change in the behaviour of the system at its 
interface to the outside world has no effect on safety, so the only defects that are of interest are 
those where failure conditions at the boundary are paired with failure conditions of functional 
processes, so if one can provide a complete classification of either then all relevant failure 
conditions will be identified. 
Example of Function-oriented Hazard Identification – Aircraft Industry FHA
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) was originally developed in the aerospace sector, although 
the name and methods have been carried across to other industries. The standard procedures and 
practices for performing this method in the civil aerospace sector have been codified in the ARP 
4761 standard (ARP 4761:1996). The general approach is to examine the functional requirements 
specification of a system, and then to identify three generic failure conditions associated with each 
functional requirement:
 Failure to operate as/when intended
 Unintended or inadvertent operation
 Malfunction (a.k.a. misleading function)
The method proceeds by generating three hypothetical failure conditions (one of each type) for 
each functional requirements of the system. Hypothetical conditions that are implausible can be 
ignored, but for all others a precise description of the failure condition is defined. Then, for each 
failure condition the consequences of the condition are identified. Since the nature of the system’s 
environment often varies throughout the operational use of a system, the consequences are 
assessed over different partitions of the system mission (in an aircraft these are its flight phases 
such as take-off, landing, cruise, etc.) in order to identify different consequences of the same 
failure condition if it was to occur in different environmental circumstances. The severity of harm 
of each distinct consequence is determined, usually in terms of the number and degree of injuries 
caused to persons (crew, passengers or third parties). These hazard identification results are then 
used as the basis of a risk assessment, where the probability of occurrence of each failure condition 
is assessed and if found to present an unacceptable risk then the system function can be redesigned 
so as to eliminate the problem, or safeguards built into the design to reduce the expected 
probability of occurrence to such a level that the risk is acceptable. The results of the FHA are 
usually presented in tabular format similar to the example shown in Table 1:
9Table 1: Example Hazard Identification Analysis Table Format
# Model 
Element
Keyword Mission 
Phase / Mode
Failure 
Description
Consequence 
Description
Consequence 
Severity
Possible 
Corrective 
Action
Residual 
Probability
Cause(s) Design Recommendations
1 Function 
A
Omission Normal 
operation
Function does 
not operate 
when 
intended
Robot fails to 
perform service
Marginal 1. User action
2. Redundant 
subsystem
3. Diverse 
function
1. 10-6 hr-1
2. 10-4 hr-1
3. 10-8 hr-1
Faults or design 
errors in 
subsystems 
performing 
Function A
System shall incorporate a diverse 
function for Function A.
 Function A: SIL 1
 Diverse function: SIL 1
2 Commission Protective 
stop
Function 
operates 
when not 
intended 
while a 
protective 
stop is in 
progress
Inadvertent 
operation 
prevents safe 
stop – major 
injuries to robot 
user(s) and/or 
third parties
Critical Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
3 Early/Late Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
4 Coarse error Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
5 Subtle error Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
6 Input A Omission All phases Loss of input 
signal
Function A fails 
to operate
Marginal 1. Input 
validation 
mechanism
2. Redundant 
input
3. Diverse input
1. 10-5 hr-1
2. 10-6 hr-1
3. 10-8 hr-1
Fault in Input A 
interface element
 Validation mechanisms shall be 
provided for Input A
 Input A shall be dual redundant
 Function a shall receive Input B as 
a diverse check against Input A
7 Commission All phases N/A – input is 
required to be 
permanently 
active
N/A N/A N/A N/A External system / 
process transmits 
information 
erroneously via 
Input A.
N/A
8 Early/Late Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
Note: in many practical industrial hazard analyses, the process includes both hazard identification and risk assessment, where the severity and predicted probability of occurrence 
of a failure condition are assessed. Residual probability estimates frequency of occurrence of specific failures after all safety measures have been taken into account. Typically,
probability estimates are obtained by reliability analysis of the system design or from established references e.g. reliability databases. This paper is not concerned with the 
problem of risk assessment, only the problem of how to identify a set of hazards that is as complete as is reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, probability analysis will not be 
discussed any further.
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Example of Interface-oriented Hazard Identification – HAZOP
One of the most widely known interface-oriented analysis methods is HAZOP (HAZard and 
Operability studies). This method was originally developed in the chemical process control industry, 
and has since been codified in the IEC 61882 standard (IEC 61882:2001). As discussed earlier, 
HAZOP proceeds by a systematic analysis of failure conditions in the flow parameters across the 
boundary interface of the system. In general, flows are any information (data, signals), energy 
(electrical or mechanical power), fluid flow (chemical reagents, fuel), or mechanical force (structural 
loads and stresses, mechanical actions) that pass across the system boundary.
HAZOP identifies a number of guidewords which have the same role as the generic failure conditions 
of aerospace industry FHA. Guidewords are generally tailored to the technological domain of the 
system being analysed, i.e. different keyword sets for electrical/hydraulic/pneumatic/mechanical 
machines, fluid dynamical interfaces or mechanisms, analogue or digital electronics, software 
processes. However, most keywords relate to the flow of energy, force, information, or physical 
material across the system boundary interface, and generally identify deviations in the value, timing, or 
provision of service across a boundary interface. The guidewords that were originally identified for the 
original HAZOP version (as specified in IEC 61882) are listed in 
Table 2.
Table 2: HAZOP Generic Guidewords
Guide Word Meaning
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent
MORE Quantitative increase
LESS Quantitative decrease
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent
OTHER THAN Complete substitution
EARLY Relative to the clock time
LATE Relative to the clock time
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence
AFTER Relating to order or sequence
The method proceeds by developing an interpretation table for the flow parameters of the system, 
where the keywords are applied to the parameter types and specific definitions of the failure conditions 
are defined, if the combination is plausible. Some examples of guideword interpretations are provided 
in Table 3. Then the relevant interpretations are applied to the parameters of the boundary interface and 
the effects on system functions and consequences on its interaction with the environment are assessed. 
The results are tabulated in a similar manner to the format shown in Table 1.
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Table 3: Sample HAZOP Guideword Interpretation Table
Parameter 
/ Guide 
Word
More Less None Reverse As well as Part of Other 
than
Flow high flow low flow no flow reverse 
flow
deviating 
concentratio
n
contaminatio
n
deviatin
g 
material
Pressure high 
pressure
low 
pressure
vacuum delta-p explosio
n
Temperatur
e
high 
temperatur
e
low 
temperatur
e
Level high level low level no level different 
level
Time too long / 
too late
too short / 
too soon
sequenc
e step 
skipped
backward
s
missing 
actions
extra actions wrong 
time
Since HAZOP was originally developed for industrial process control systems, variants of HAZOP 
have been proposed for computer systems and software, which follow the same general methodology 
but propose guidewords that are more appropriate for flows of data and electronic signals than fluid and 
mechanical forces. Two variants of note are defined in the UK Defence Standard 00-58 (UK MoD 
2000) and the SHARD Method, developed at the University of York (Pumfrey 1999). The former uses 
the same guideword set as basic HAZOP but offers guidance that is more tailored to the study of 
computer-based systems. The latter is notable in that it proposes a different set of guidewords 
developed from a survey of computer/software failure cases. The new guidewords are related to the 
functional service that is provided through a given flow parameter, and are described in Table 4.
Table 4: SHARD Generic Guidewords
Service Failure Guideword Meaning
Service Provision OMISSION Functional service not provided when intended
COMMISSION Functional service provided when not intended
Service Timing EARLY Functional service provided earlier than intended
LATE Functional service provided later than intended
Service Value COARSE Value of functional service parameters is coarsely 
incorrect (illegal value)
SUBTLE Value of functional service parameters is subtly 
incorrect (value is legal but incorrect)
Although the guideword set is different to HAZOP, the procedural methodology of SHARD is 
otherwise unchanged, with interpretation tables being developed for the range of software/electronic 
interface flow parameter types, and then the specific failure conditions being applied to the actual 
parameters of each such interface to determine the functional failures and their consequences.
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The SHARD guideword set is interesting; its definition of failure types in service provision terms and 
flow behaviour terms is (respectively) both function-oriented and interface-oriented. This was one of 
the reasons why the SHARD guideword set was used in the initial hazard analysis studies of a robot 
waiter at BRL, which are described in Section 4.
3.1.3 Other Keyword based Safety Analyses: FMEA
Hazard analysis is not the only safety analysis technique to use a keyword-driven approach – another 
widely used technique is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). FMEA differs from FHA in two 
principal ways – the keyword set and the level of design detail used as the information on which the 
analysis is based. FMEA is typically applied at a much later stage of system development, when a 
detailed design is available for the system and its components. The keywords used are often related to 
very specific fault types of physical components (e.g. short-circuit faults, varying parameter values).
FMEA was employed as a safety analysis technique on one of the BRL projects discussed in this paper. 
In one of the SAR robot design studies, FMEA was used to analyse a particular robot task (tele-
operated navigation).
For example, in the SAR Robot design problem, an initial assumption was that when the rescuer offers 
a piece of rubble he or she knows the robot gripping size capacity. However, it is possible that a 
fatigued rescue worker picks a wrong-size piece of rubble and passes it to the robot. Thus, the robot 
needs a software module to assess the offered piece. As an initial design step, Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA – see Annex A) was used to identify interaction-related tasks, to define a basis on 
which possible failure modes can be identified using FMEA. A well-known task analysis approach, 
HTA provides a description of the system operations toward achieving system end goal by clarifying 
relationships between tasks and sub-task and their order of execution (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992) . 
The task hierarchy is developed by assigning ultimate goal of the system at top and then defining each 
tasks involved in goal attainment. In each level, a plan describes the order of execution of tasks.
FMEA was originally established for system components reliability analysis and later its application 
extended to human error analysis. This technique provides compact information about the system 
failures in a tabular format. Hence, it was expected to be a strong tool to address failures of both sides 
of interaction; the robot and a human rescuer. One row of the obtained FMEA table (Sobhani, 2012) for 
one of the tasks failure is presented in Table 5. Failure of tele-operated navigation is when operator 
tries to send the robot to a position, while the robot obstacle avoidance module prevents it to move to 
get there. This failure can be due to either lack of the operator’s situation awareness or a fault in the 
robot reasoning or sensory information.
This analysis provides a concise frame work for investigating different aspects of the system, 
qualitatively. FMEA outcome is fed to a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to investigate the role of each 
involved element for each revealed failures modes. Originally developed in the aerospace and defence 
industries, FTA is a powerful method utilized to assess reliability of multifaceted systems. A tree-like 
diagram structure is used to demonstrate the contribution of the basic events and their relative 
importance in a specific system failure mode. A fault tree is developed for each failure mode revealed 
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in the FMEA. For each tree, the relationship between contributed elements toward the system failure is 
described by Boolean algebra and finding minimal cutest expression. This analysis can potentially 
provide both qualitative and quantitative frameworks for prioritizing role and importance of each faulty 
component. Although qualitative FTA has been insightful, performing a quantitative analysis is faced a 
serious challenge of finding failure and success rates and probabilities. For hardware components it is 
possible to have such data based on their reliability tests, nonetheless, finding failure rate of software 
modules and human error probability is far more difficult and challenging. Even the performance of 
hardware components can differ from their published reliability values when the robot is in an
unpredictable and dynamic disaster environment. It is also noteworthy that qualitative FTA has been 
performed for a semi-autonomous robot and based on a certain restricted scenario (Lankenau & Meyer
1999) in which all the basic events have been predicted in advance, while for a fully autonomous robot 
predicting all the basic events is difficult to achieve.
Table 5: The First Row of the FMEA Table
Task Failure 
Mode
Causes Fault/Error 
Type
Failure Effect Potential 
Recovery Type
Severity
1.1-Tele-operated 
Navigation
Paradox Lack of situation 
awareness
Human-
made
Unreachable 
Destination/
Damage to 
Robot
Rollback-Roll
forward, 
Compensation
Marginal
Incomplete 
Input
Rescuer out of the 
field of view
Human-
made
Rollback-Roll
forward
Marginal
Delayed 
Input
Delayed / 
Disrupted 
Communication
Hardware Rollback- Roll
forward
Marginal
No Input Camera doesn’t 
Work
Hardware No Recovery: 
repair action 
required
Critical
Paradox Ranger / Proximity 
Sensor Fault
Hardware Rollback- Roll
forward, Isolation
Marginal
4 Initial Experiments in Hazard Analysis of Robots – Robot Waiter Application
The research at BRL began as an exercise to support the authors’ contributions to the development of 
the ISO 13482 industrial safety standard for mobile service robots. The standard includes a list of 
hazards that are expected to be common to many robot designs, and the original aim of the exercise 
was to conduct a hazard analysis of a proposed design to determine other possible hazards that could be 
submitted to the list. A partial mobile robot application design was developed to a point where a 
preliminary hazard analysis could be conducted, although it was not envisaged that the design would be 
taken through to full implementation.
The original intent of the analysis study was to apply existing hazard analysis techniques that have been 
developed for conventional industrial systems, with the secondary aim of evaluating the suitability of 
existing design and analysis methods to autonomous system applications. However, the attempt 
revealed a number of problems, the result of which was the proposal of a new method.
14
In this section we describe the specification of the robotic application that we studied, the hazard 
analysis technique that was applied, and we discuss the results that were obtained from the analysis 
sessions.
4.1 Robot Waiter Task Specification
Preliminary hazard analysis requires at least a high-level/abstract system model on which to operate, so 
it was necessary to produce a basic specification and architecture model of the Robot Waiter as input to 
the PHA process. A basic task specification of the robot was developed using Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA, see Annex A) and a preliminary system architecture model was developed using the 
NASA Goddard Agent Architecture reference model (see Annex B). This allowed a basic identification 
of the functional processes that might serve as architectural components of such a system. The task-
process model was then taken as the basis for the PHA. The Robot Waiter task involves an autonomous 
mobile robot acting as a human waiter, delivering drinks to a human customer. Specifically this 
requires the robot to be capable of taking a drink order from a customer, fetching the correct drink and 
finally delivering the drink to the customer. In defining the Robot Waiter task specification a number of 
assumptions were made about the robots design and operating environment. These assumptions are as 
follows:
Table 6: BRL Robot waiter study - design assumptions
Category Assumptions
Mechanical assumptions  The robot will have only one manipulator for carrying drinks.
 The robot will transport drinks in an internal compartment.
Environmental assumptions  All drinks to be served will be placed in specific areas on a table surface (the bar), 
which are pre-determined and known by (programmed into) the robot.
 The environment is a single-storey flat surface with no stairs to be climbed.
 An area of the environment is reserved as a waiting location while the robot is not 
serving customers.
 A number of specific environments were envisaged for the robot:
o A laboratory lounge area
o A restaurant
o A bar
o A demonstration area of a robotics conference
o At home
 It is assumed that drinks will be provided in the following types of container:
a) A stiff polystyrene cup, of cylindrical or inverted (upside-down) conic 
section profile, with a lid attached to the top and without any handles
b) A near-cylindrical plastic bottle (e.g. mineral water bottle) with no handles
 It is assumed that bar tables will have their own drainage to capture spilled drinks, 
or that any such spillages will be promptly cleaned up by bar staff. It is assumed 
that spillages at the bar table will not leak onto the café / restaurant main floor.
Operational assumptions  The robot will only have a drinks serving (waiter) role; drinks preparation 
(bartending) role is outside the scope of this design. It is assumed that requested 
drinks will be prepared and placed into the correct areas on the bar by another 
agent – the bartender – who may be human or artificial.
 The robot will take an order, transport and serve a drink one at a time.
 The robot will wait to be called (reactive), not to offer drinks proactively.
 The robot may optionally hand over drink to customer, place drink on a table, or 
leave drink on tray.
No special behaviour is required for particular drinks, for example if they were to be 
served in different mugs, cups and saucers, or other types of drink container. It is 
assumed that all types of drinks to be served can be handled in the same manner, and 
that no special behaviour is required because a drink is hot, cold, or unusually delicate 
in some manner.
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In order to maintain consistency between different design studies, these assumptions should be carried 
over to future work. The following section discusses the functional design of the Robot Waiter task.
The HTA results for the Robot Waiter task are included in Extension 1 to the online version of this 
paper. The hierarchical decomposition of the robot’s tasks in textual form is provided in a tabular form 
in Extension 2. This table starts from the top level Task 0 “Deliver Ordered Drink to Customer”. This 
top level task is achieved by performing the sub-tasks of waiting in the waiting location and scanning 
the room for a customer, attending the customer to take a drink order, getting the requested drink from 
the bar, delivering the drink to the customer, and then asking the customer if everything is satisfactory. 
The analysis also considers some of the principal error situations that may occur in performing this 
service, such as where the requested drink is unavailable at the bar, or if the customer is missing when 
the drink is delivered. Each task is assigned a Behaviour Type, which classifies the task according to 
the NASA Goddard Agent Architecture Model (Rouff et al., 2006) – see Annex B and Table 14. This 
model has been used to identify the nature of the cognitive processes that are required in order to 
perform the task. This model allows other design analyses such as preliminary functional failure / 
hazard analyses to be performed without requiring explicit details about the implementation, which are 
not available at this stage of development.
4.2 Robot Waiter Functional Architecture Model
The functional architecture of the Robot Waiter was developed by a three-step procedure:
a) Identify the Behaviour Type of each task, as defined in the NASA Goddard Agent Model (see 
Table 14)
b) For each task, identify the cognitive processes employed within the task, as implied by the 
task behaviour type and the relevant processes for that type as shown in Figure 9 to Figure 16
of Annex B.
c) For each cognitive process, identify any essential parameters or global variables used by the 
process, any special hardware required, and the data flow across the boundary of the process 
(the interface).
The result of this design step was a large task-process model, which is provided in Extension 3 to the 
online version of this paper.
4.3 Hazard Analysis Methodology of the Experiment
The hazard analysis of the robot waiter design model proceeded as a set of six sessions over the April –
June 2011 period. The authors were the participating team for all of the sessions. The procedure 
adopted for the analysis was to use the SHARD guideword set listed in Section 3.1.2 and work through 
the Task-Process Model of the Robot Waiter applying the SHARD guidewords to the task description. 
Causes of any plausible hazards were identified as functional failures of the Goddard reference 
architecture elements that were relevant to the task as defined in the Task-Process Model.
The SHARD method was selected because it has both function-oriented and interface-oriented aspects, 
and since the functional architecture model described in Section 4.2 contains elements of both types of 
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model, it was considered to be the most appropriate. The SHARD guidewords shown in Table 4 were 
used in the analysis.
The analysis proceeded in a typical manner for this type of analysis, with the team discussing each 
element of the model in turn and assessing the potential consequences of its failure. The consequences 
were logged in a hazard analysis table, a fragment of which is shown in Table 7. Since functional 
hazard analysis is very time consuming, a complete analysis (all keywords applied to all model 
elements) was not performed, only a subset sufficient to demonstrate the method.
4.4 Discussion of the Results
Table 7 provides a representative sample of the results that were generated in the analysis sessions. In 
many respects, this is similar to the kind of results that are achieved in similar analyses of non-robotic 
systems and as it stands the results show that this kind of analysis can yield useful safety requirements. 
However, the results themselves do not reveal the issues that drove the research described in this paper, 
which emerged from the flow of the discussions that formed the process itself.
As the analysis sessions proceeded, it became apparent that the analysis guide words were not directing 
the team discussion in the manner intended; the failure conditions of individual elements of the model 
became less significant in the discussion than the identification of the circumstances of the robot’s 
situation in its environment and the features of the environment with which the robot must interact. It 
was very difficult to determine the exact consequences of a robot’s action and their severity until it is 
known with what the robot might be interacting. 
For example if a robot moves across a room at high speed, either due to its control system or due to a 
motor failure, there may be the potential for a collision with some object in the environment. However, 
the precise consequences and the severity of those consequences will depend on what collides with the 
robot. If the object is a chair or a table, then the consequence (a damaged table or chair knocked over) 
is not particularly severe. If the object is a person, especially a child, then the consequences are 
significantly higher in severity and it may be necessary to design safety features into the robot to 
reduce the risk of this occurrence.
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Table 7: Sample fragment of preliminary hazard analysis table from BRL Robot Waiter design study
Model Element Failure 
Type
Failure 
Description
Operating 
Phase
Consequence 
Description
Cause Description Corrective Action 
(design only)
Design Recommendations / 
Safety Requirements
Task 3.2 Pick Up Drink
Pick up one example of the 
requested type of drink (and put it 
in the storage compartment)
Omission Arm fails to 
move
At Bar Loss of service; 
no safety effect
- - Assumptions:
● Drinks provided in stiff plastic / 
polystyrene cup, with lid attached 
to cover the top, or will be (near-) 
cylindrical plastic bottles (e.g. 
mineral water bottles)
● Drinks cups will not have handles
Arm fails to 
move wrist to 
correct table 
location
At Bar Robot knocks 
over other drinks, 
causing spillage 
on bar table
Assumption:
 Bar table has drainage or will 
prevent spillages from leaking 
onto floor
Arm drives into 
table surface
At Bar Damage to arm 
and table; other 
drinks knocked 
over (on bar table)
Subsequent 
hazards may occur 
due to damaged 
arm
● Execution: controller 
fault/error
● Perceptors: sensor 
faults
● Modelling & State: 
errors in world 
mapping or object 
(drink cup) mapping
● Effectors: arm motor 
faults
Provision of proximity 
sensors on arm
Robot shall use proximity sensor 
positioned about its arm, to detect 
potential collisions with table 
surfaces
If robot drops a cup at bar table, then 
it will repeat task afterwards
Arm drives into 
drink cup/bottle
At Bar Spillage of one or 
more drinks on 
bar table
- - Arm trajectory design (sliding 
motion not chopping motion)
Gripper fails to 
move
At Bar Drink knocked 
over (on bar table) 
if arm 
subsequently 
moves sideways
- Continuous contact 
detection and real-time 
monitoring; if no 
contact then arm must 
reverse its trajectory 
(exit strategy)
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Model Element Failure 
Type
Failure 
Description
Operating 
Phase
Consequence 
Description
Cause Description Corrective Action 
(design only)
Design Recommendations / 
Safety Requirements
Gripper fails to 
grip cup with 
sufficient 
strength
At Bar Drink slides out of 
the gripper, 
causing spillage 
over bar table
● Execution: controller 
fault/error
● Perceptors: sensor 
faults
● Modelling & State: 
errors in world 
mapping or object 
(drink cup) mapping
● Effectors: gripper 
motor faults
Redundant or 
independent pressure 
sensing separate from 
task controller
Use of conically-
shaped cups
Use of deformable 
soft-touch sensors
Gripper force feedback 
detection
Delayed drink cup 
slippage will 
cause spillage on 
floor
Gripper fails to 
grip cup in 
appropriate 
position
At Bar Cup spins within 
grip, causing 
spillage on bar 
table
Gripper design Robot shall employ a gripper design 
that prevents the cup spinning within 
the robot’s grip (e.g. four-fingered 
gripper)
Robot fails to 
open storage 
compartment 
door
At Bar Robot arm 
smashes into door, 
causing spillage 
onto floor and 
possible damage 
to robot (sharp 
pieces on floor)
If robot is away from bar table, it 
shall stop and indicate spillage after 
cup is dropped or knocked over
Robot fails to 
put drink inside 
storage 
compartment
At Bar Spillage of drink 
over robot and 
floor
Drink already stored
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During the analysis, it became clear to us that the guide words being used for the analysis were not 
encouraging the team to consider different types of environmental interaction. The guide words were 
applied to elements of the internal design of the robot, albeit at an abstract level, and were effective in 
identifying a comprehensive range of internal errors, but did not assist with the identification of 
external features with which the robot might interact in its intended environment. The only external 
features that were mentioned were those that were inherent to the robot’s intended mission, which had 
been identified in the tasks developed in the hierarchical task analysis design process. Other features 
that can plausibly be considered to be present at least occasionally are not mentioned, and there is a 
very real risk that the analysis process may overlook potential hazards that are reasonably foreseeable, 
which may lead to accident risks not being reduced to acceptable levels. Furthermore, the apparent 
completeness of guide word sets such as SHARD and HAZOP may mislead manufacturers into 
believing that their hazard assessment is as complete when it is not, which could have serious 
implications for their liability and for the risk to the public of their products.
The conclusions reached by the team during this initial trial study suggested the concept that while the 
team had specified those tasks that were required of the robot to perform its intended duty, there were
potentially a lot of tasks that may be required of a robot simply to exist in its environment and survive 
long enough to be available to perform its intended tasks without causing any undesirable situations or 
unacceptable accidents.
This revelation led us to define the concept of mission tasks and non-mission tasks, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Types of interactions for autonomous systems
Mission tasks are defined as those task required for the robot to fulfil its intended function or mission, 
which are typically identified by design processes such as hierarchical task analysis or similar methods. 
20
Mission tasks handle the expected interactions of the robot with its environment – those that are likely 
to occur in most instances of its mission.
Non-mission tasks are those tasks other than mission tasks that are necessary to allow a robot to 
‘survive’, i.e. to maintain its state of operational readiness whenever a mission is not in progress or to 
perform a task at any time that prevents the occurrence of hazards (or reduces their risk). Non-mission 
tasks handle the unexpected interactions – those that are reasonably foreseeable but not expected to 
occur often.
The proliferation of non-mission interactions in comparison to the mission interactions, which were 
identified by the team in BRL Robot Waiter hazard analysis sessions, led us to understand that the non-
mission tasks may well comprise the great majority of the robot’s functionality or behavioural 
repertoire. It also led to the idea that the ability to cope with non-mission interactions may be a defining 
aspect of the difference between an automatic and an autonomous system. Automatic systems are 
designed to perform mission tasks without human intervention, but do not include any provision within 
their design for handling non-mission interactions. These are handled either by designing the 
environment of the system to exclude the possibility of any interactions other than those related to its 
mission, or else humans remain in the system in a supervisory mode, handling or preventing any non-
mission interactions while the automatic system performs the mission task(s). Industrial machines and 
automatic (driverless) railways are good examples of this concept. In contrast, autonomous systems 
have no human control or supervisory input whatsoever, and are generally expected to operate in 
environments that have not been pre-prepared for its operation. Robot waiters in cafes and wheeled 
rovers on other planets are good examples of this concept. Thus, the mission vs. non-mission task 
classification concept offers an intriguing insight into what the differences are between these classes of 
system.
Automatic
Degree of 
Autonomy
Autonomous
• Only intended to perform mission tasks
• Operation in restricted/constrained environments that 
eliminate non-mission interactions
• No manual control
• Some manual supervision
• Operation in open unconstrained environments in 
which interactions may occur outside the intended 
mission scenarios
• No manual control or supervision
hence
• Required to perform non-mission tasks
Large jump in complexity!
Figure 3: Comparison of Automatic and Autonomous Systems
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This relationship between the categories of automatic and autonomous systems can also be seen as 
defining a degree of autonomy measure, at least in a qualitative sense, as represented in Figure 3. The 
more non-mission interactions a system is required to handle by itself without any human intervention 
or without prior preparation of its environment, the greater its degree of autonomy.
Non-mission interactions are what makes the hazard analysis of autonomous agents (such as mobile 
robots) more difficult than conventional systems - it requires an additional analysis step to identify the 
non-mission interactions of an autonomous system as a necessary first step before proceeding to 
identify hazards derived from internal failures in the traditional manner. Since there may well be many 
more non-mission tasks required of a robot than mission tasks, this additional step becomes the 
dominant design/analysis activity in the development of a robot. The increased effort required for the 
design of non-mission tasks will make the development process of the robot more expensive than an 
equivalent automatic system with manual supervision, and the determination of the most appropriate 
level of automation will be a crucial design decision having a significant effect on a system’s 
development costs and timescales and its operating costs.
Hazard analysis methods intended for identifying potentially hazardous non-mission interactions and 
defining safety requirements must therefore provide a systematic method for identifying potential 
hazards associated with non-mission tasks, when those tasks may not be defined in the robot’s 
functional requirement specification. Therefore, new methods, or variations on existing methods, are 
needed to fill this gap and provide a more effective method for performing preliminary hazard analysis 
of autonomous systems such as mobile robots. The method we propose is called Environmental Survey 
Hazard Analysis, which is described in Section 5.
5 Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis
In this section we propose a new variant of hazard analysis, called Environmental Survey Hazard 
Analysis (ESHA), which is intended on identifying non-mission interactions and the potential hazards 
that may be associated with them, as a preliminary hazard analysis exercise that should be performed 
prior to the more traditional internally focused hazard analysis exercises that are typically performed 
for conventional non-robotic systems (Harper et al, 2011).
5.1 Objectives of New Method
As discussed in Section 3.1, the objective of any hazard analysis method is to provide an objectively 
demonstrable basis for demonstrating that all reasonably foreseeable hazards have been identified. This 
must also be the objective of any method that seeks to identify hazards associated with non-mission 
interactions. The method must provide a classification framework that can be argued as providing 
complete coverage of the range of foreseeable non-mission interactions at some level of abstraction, 
and since it is not practicable to identify every instance of any foreseeable interaction in any possible 
robotic application in or operating environment, a classification scheme is necessary at a higher level of 
abstraction, which provides full coverage of the abstract model but leaves it to the human analysts to 
supply all reasonably foreseeable examples of each category for the target application and environment.
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However, this criterion in and of itself does not offer any guidance as to what the hazard classification 
scheme should be, and therefore any such choice will be arbitrary with respect to the above objective. 
Therefore it is necessary to draw on other ideas to provide the framework. 
Our current proposal is based on an abstract model of the situated-ness of a robot in its environment. 
An autonomous mobile robot is an agent embedded in its environment, perceiving the world through its 
sensors and taking action using its effectors (motors, manipulators etc.) to change its state or the state 
of features in the external environment. One way to classify features of the environment, in a manner 
that may be convenient to the design of safety mechanisms, could be to classify them abstractly in 
terms of size or shape as perceived by the robot through its sensors. Therefore, instead of classifying 
hazards based on the precise identity of particular features, which would lead to an open-ended list, we 
propose to classify them in terms of abstract properties that we can be certain cover all possible 
features.
Given this frame of reference, we argue that the entire environment perceived by the robot through its 
sensors can be divided into the following categories:
 Environmental Features: these are features associated with the background environment 
itself, rather than any object situated within it, and their state is fixed 
to the frame of reference of the environment.
 Objects: these are features that are embedded or situated within the 
environment, but are assigned their own distinct identity and state, 
and are often assigned their own frames of reference.
We argue that everything in the environment can be considered either a background feature or an 
object, and thus this level of classification is complete. 
Background environmental features can be further sub-divided into invariant and varying features, the 
former including terrain features and the latter including ambient conditions. Terrain features describe 
features of the structre or configuration of the environment itself (i.e. not with any object situated in the 
environment) that generally remain fixed or constant during the operation of the robot. These include 
geographic areas, for example “urban”, “indoors” or “marine”, particular types of surface such as 
“paved road” or “grass” or terrain features such as ‘lakes’ or ‘pathways’. Variable environmental 
features do change over time, the most common of which are ambient conditions, such as temperature 
or pressure.
We have classified Objects by means of several abstract properties. One obvious abstract property of an 
object is its shape. To provide a classification that covers all possible shapes, we have proposed a set of 
categories based on the dimensionality of their shape – point-like (0D), linear (1D), surface (2D), and 
volumetric (3D). Everything in the environment that has a shape will fall into these categories. A 
second property we have used is motion. Objects may either be stationary or moving; the former may 
either be immovable (fixed in place) or may be movable, either by the robot itself or by the action of 
others. The third property we have used is agency, which is considered for moving objects, in which we 
consider whether an object is moving purposefully or not.
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In all these categorizations, we have applied wherever possible logically exclusive definitions, so that 
the hazard analysis guidewords derived from them cannot admit any other possibilities. This means that 
by following the guidewords human safety analysts are assisted in achieving the aim of identifying all 
reasonably foreseeable hazards, because the logical structure of the classification is complete.
While it must be admitted that the choice of classification is arbitrary, it is guided heuristically by an 
understanding of the domain problem. One of the aims of this research is to assess whether the 
classification scheme is useful in guiding human analysts towards an effective identification of 
environmental interactions and their potential hazards. If the proposed classification was unhelpful in 
this respect, we should expect to receive feedback from analysts claiming that it was difficult to apply 
the guidewords constructively, and that the guidewords hindered them from thinking clearly about the 
problem. The discussion in Section 6 describes the feedback we have received so far from our 
experiments to date.
Environmental 
Survey
Environmental Features
Obstacles & Simple Objects
Agents
Terrain Areas
Terrain Surfaces
Terrain Features
Ambient Conditions
Other Features
Point Obstacles
Linear Obstacles
Surface Obstacles
Volumetric Obstacles
Stationary Immovable
Stationary Movable
Moving (non-agents)
Unintelligent (automatic) systems
Autonomous systems / other robots
Animals
Humans
Figure 4: Classification scheme used in Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis
Following the above argument, the ESHA classification scheme is shown in Error! Reference source 
not found., in which all of the categories mentioned above are integrated together. The initial
classification of environmental features combines the basic feature types with the complexity of their 
behaviour, dividing the complete environment into three possible classes:
 Environmental features – these are invariant, large-scale and semi-permanent features of the 
environment that provide the reference frame within which other objects exist. 
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 Obstacles and Simple Objects – these are objects that are situated within the framework of the 
static environmental features described above, which may be fixed, movable, or even actively 
moving, but whose behaviour is not goal-directed in any way, i.e. their behaviour cannot be 
defined as purposeful in any way.
 Agents – these are objects that are moving in the environment in a purposeful way, i.e. their 
behaviour is goal-directed.
This classification of features maintains its logical completeness as discussed in previous paragraphs, 
and requires no default alternate category to do so (as is done for Environmental Features, as discussed  
below).
For the Environmental Features category, we have defined the following principal sub-categories: 
terrain surface types, terrain areas, terrain features, and ambient conditions. The argument is that the 
robot will perceive the world as one or more different areas, each of which has a given type of surface 
and contains a set of terrain features and ambient conditions. Since this classification scheme is not 
logically closed, we must admit to the possibility of other types of environment feature that do not fall 
into the secondary scheme; therefore we have added a default secondary category that covers all 
features not covered by the first four. This closes the logical completeness of this level of the 
classification, and although it does not provide positive guidance to analysts it will at least remind them 
that they must consider other possibilities and encourages analysts to search for any exceptional 
features that are not covered by the initial classification.
For the Obstacles and Simple Objects category, we have defined four shape/structure categories that 
reflect how these features may be perceived by a robot: Point Obstacles (0-D), Linear Obstacles (1-D), 
Surface Obstacles (2-D) and Volumetric Obstacles (3-D). We argue that all objects in the environment 
will be perceived by the robot as having a shape or structure that is point-like, line-like, surface-like or 
will have a perceived volume. Therefore, by encouraging analysts to search for features that have these 
shape characteristics, we argue that they will search through all reasonably foreseeable features within 
the target environment. Since this is a logically closed classification it does not require any default 
category called “other types” or similar. We have also further sub-divided the volumetric obstacles into 
a further sub-category based on whether its movement can be influenced by the actions of the robot: 
Stationary Immovable (i.e. obstacles that cannot be pushed out of the way), Stationary Movable 
(obstacles that can be pushed out of the way by the robot or due to other actions) and Moving 
(obstacles that do move, but not in any purposeful way i.e. they are not agents).
For the Agents category, we have defined four categories that capture the full range of behaviour 
patterns that any agent may exhibit, which is perceived by the robot. The secondary categories are: 
Automatic Systems (performing mission tasks only), Autonomous Systems and Other Robots (which 
perform both mission and non-mission tasks), Animals (autonomous biological creatures exhibiting 
purposeful but non-sentient behaviour) and Humans (autonomous biological creatures exhibiting 
purposeful and sentient behaviour1).
1 Until the existence of other sentient species is proved, we consider humans to be the only category of autonomous biological 
creatures exhibiting purposeful and sentient behaviour, and hence no other species need be named in this category. The sub-
categories of agents are only developed for the purposes of our classification and have no authority for any other purpose.
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These classification categories are being tested in on-going design studies and trials at Bristol Robotics 
Laboratory, the first tranche of which are reported in Section 6 of this paper. It is anticipated that the 
classification scheme and the associated guide words (see Section 5.2) will evolve over time depending 
on how useful they are in guiding analysts in the systematic identification of non-mission interactions 
and tasks. As discussed in section 7, it is anticipated that the classification scheme may evolve 
significantly as different classes of robotic applications are studied or developed.
5.2 Procedure of New Method
For the trials described in Section 6, we developed a set of aids for performing an ESHA analysis:
1. An ESHA Procedure Checklist, which contains the classification categories mentioned in 
Section 5.1 above, and provide non-exhaustive lists of examples as an aid to the analyst(s). 
The checklist contains a number of questions designed to guide the analyst(s) in thinking 
through the application of the ESHA classification guide words as shown in Error! 
Reference source not found.. The checklist is provided in the text boxes on the following 
three pages.
2. A generic ESHA worksheet (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) which provides 
a tabular format for recording the results of the analysis. It is similar in layout to Table 1, but 
the column titles are aligned to the output of the ESHA procedure information.
The full worksheet template and checklist have also been provided as Extensions 4 and 5 to the online 
version of this paper.
The Procedure Checklist consists of three parts, for Environmental Features, Obstacles and Simple 
Objects, and Agents. Each part comprises a series of steps, characterised by questions, in which the 
classification scheme mentioned previously in this section is applied to identify potential environmental 
interactions (mission and non-mission related), and then to determine whether the interactions have 
potential hazards and to identify possible safety measures that may reduce or eliminate the risk of those 
hazards. These safety measures would then become system safety requirements for the robot, to be 
incorporated into its design.
The standard Worksheet Template is matched to the Procedure Checklist, and is intended to provide a 
tabular format for recording the results of the assessments and decisions of the hazard analysis process, 
so that they can be reviewed afterwards for the purposes of safety assurance, or to repeat/revise the 
results if necessary.
The checklist and worksheet template have been applied in some (but not all) of the experiments 
conducted to date, and the assessment of that work is discussed in Section 6 and Section 7.
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ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
1: Analysis of Environmental Features
Are there any specific examples of the following features of the environment in which the robot is intended to 
operate?
● What specific areas exist in the environment?
e.g. Interior: rooms, corridors, stairs, elevators, escalators, slide-ways
e.g. Exterior: lawns, sidewalks, roads, fields, woods/trees,  scrubland (low vegetation), 
marshland
● What types of terrain surface? (e.g. Interior: floor surface types)
e.g. Exterior: terrain types: paved, grass, mud, sand, gravel, rocky,  water, paved/unpaved 
paths
● What types of terrain feature?
e.g. Interior: walls, doors, windows, barriers, prohibited areas)
e.g. Exterior: barriers, fences boundaries, prohibited areas, flower beds, trees, ponds
● What ranges of ambient conditions?
e.g. Lighting levels, air temperature
e.g. Special conditions such as steam/water vapour, snow/ice, smoke/fire, corrosive atmosphere, 
salt atmosphere/spray
● Are there any other features not yet identified?
For each environmental feature, identify how the robot should interact with it.
● What should the robot do? (e.g. approach / avoid / track / manipulate)
● What are the characteristics of the interaction? (e.g. short or long range, immediate or delayed 
response, reflexive, deliberative, reactive, social/communicative)
For each interaction, what could go wrong?
● Failure to interact when intended?
● Inadvertent interaction?
● Partial interaction?
● Reverse interaction?
● Actions taken are too much, too little, more than required, less than required?
For each interaction failure, what are the consequences?
● Injury
● Damage to property
● Damage to the environment
For each consequence, what measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood of the consequences?
● Inherent safety measures (re-design the robot to eliminate the problem)
● Safeguards or protective devices (protection systems)
● Instructions to robot users (less likely if the robot is fully autonomous)
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2: Analysis of Obstacles and Simple Objects
Are there any specific examples of the following obstacles or simple objects in the environment in which the robot is 
intended to operate?
● What types of Point Obstacles are there in the environment?
e.g. light/heat/sound/odour sources
e.g. linear or volumetric obstacles viewed from a long distance
Interior: clutter objects (at far range), light sources (e.g. lamps)
Exterior:
● What types of Linear Obstacles are there in the environment?
(boundary lines/edges, vertical posts/pillars, volumetric obstacles viewed edge-on from a distance)
e.g. Interior: power cables, carpet edges, doorsteps, staircase edges
e.g. Exterior: kerbs, barriers/fences, paving-stone ruts (‘crazy-paving’)
● What types of Surface Obstacles are there in the environment?
e.g. Interior: surface spills {water, detergent, foodstuffs, domestic chemicals}, open trapdoors
e.g. Exterior: surface water/flooding, ice patches, surface spils {oil, detergent, fuel, chemicals}, manholes, 
trenches, ramps, drains, safety mirrors/reflectors
● What types of Volumetric Obstacles are there in the environment?
o Stationary-immovable
e.g. Interior: permanent furniture, food/drinks machines, power cables, tape / stretch / rope barriers, cones, 
furniture (tables, chairs, desks, office furniture), staircases, large  tables, desks, beds, domestic 
furniture, bathroom furniture, cookers, washing machines, fires/fireplaces, computer 
equipment cabinets, food/drink machines, photocopiers
e.g. Exterior: shelters, road works, garden benches
o Stationary-movable:
e.g. Interior: clutter objects (at close range), chairs, small tables
e.g. Exterior: tape/stretch barriers, bollards/cones
o Moving (non-agents) 
e.g. Interior: toys, trolleys, moving decorations (e.g. wind-chimes, hanging sculptures, childrens’ mobiles), 
ventilation fans,
e.g. Exterior: sliding doors, giant folding doors, turnstiles,
● Are there any other features not yet identified?
For each obstacle, identify how the robot should interact with it.
● What should the robot do? (e.g. approach / avoid / track / manipulate / other?)
● What are the characteristics of the interaction? (e.g. short or long range, immediate or delayed response, reflexive, 
deliberative, reactive, social/communicative)
For each interaction, what could go wrong?
● Failure to interact when intended?
● Inadvertent interaction?
● Partial interaction?
● Reverse interaction?
● Actions taken are too much, too little, more than required, less than required?
For each interaction failure, what are the consequences?
● Injury
● Damage to property
● Damage to the environment
For each consequence, what measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood of the consequences?
● Inherent safety measures (re-design the robot to eliminate the problem)
● Safeguards or protective devices (protection systems)
● Instructions to robot users (less likely if the robot is fully autonomous)
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3: Analysis of Agents
Are there any specific examples of the following agents in the environment in which the robot is intended to operate?
● Will there be any unintelligent systems  in the environment?
(e.g. Vehicles, automatic systems)
● Will there be any other autonomous systems or robots in the environment?
● Will there be any other animals (living, non-sentient) in the environment?
● Will there be any humans in the environment?
o Maturity: child / adolescent / adult / elderly
o Strength: stronger / weaker / handicapped
o Height: tall / short
o Weight: light / heavy / very heavy (i.e. obese)
o Gender: male / female (although this is not foreseen to be a likely issue)
o Impairment?
e.g. vision, hearing, touch, taste, smell (olfaction), thermal sense,  balance, manipulation ability speech, others?
o Intelligence
 Literacy: literate / illiterate / non-native language or alphabet / dyslexic
 Numeracy: numerate / innumerate / dyscalculic
 others?
o State:
 Conscious/Unconscious
 Movement: stationary/crawling/walking/running/jumping
 Attention Level:
 attentive (to the robot/system and its situation),
 distracted (not attentive to any external object or situation), 
 focussed elsewhere (attentive toward other object or situation)
● Are there any other agents not yet identified?
For each environmental feature, identify how the robot should interact with it.
● What should the robot do? (e.g. approach / avoid / track / manipulate)
● What are the characteristics of the interaction? (e.g. short or long range, immediate or delayed response, reflexive, 
deliberative, reactive, social/communicative)
For each interaction, what could go wrong?
● Failure to interact when intended?
● Inadvertent interaction?
● Partial interaction?
● Reverse interaction?
● Actions taken are too much, too little, more than required, less than required?
For each interaction failure, what are the consequences?
● Injury
● Damage to property
● Damage to the environment
For each consequence, what measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood of the consequences?
● Inherent safety measures (re-design the robot to eliminate the problem)
● Safeguards or protective devices (protection systems)
● Instructions to robot users (less likely if the robot is fully autonomous)
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Table 8: Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis – Standard Worksheet Template
Ref. No. Object:
(Environment 
Feature/Obstacle/Agent)
Interaction 
Details
Interaction Failure 
Type/keyword
Interaction 
Failure 
Details
Consequence Safety 
Measures
6 Trials of Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis
Having developed the initial ESHA method proposal, which we believe offers an improved assessment 
of mobile autonomous robot applications, we set out to evaluate the new method on further robotic 
application studies. This section provides an overview of the results collected. 
By fortunate coincidence, at the time the proposed ESHA method was being developed, the INTRO 
project was in the process of developing the initial requirements and specifications for its demonstrator 
projects. This offered an opportunity to test the new method on the demonstrator, and at a workshop at 
BRL in 2011 we held two sessions in which we used Environmental Surveys to identify conceptual 
hazards that might be associated with the application requirements that the INTRO project was 
developing as design studies for the two demonstrator projects.
In addition to the INTRO demonstrator projects, two Postgraduate (MSc) Dissertation studies were 
performed in 2012 into safety analysis and design of robotic applications. One project (the USAR 
Robot study) was a precursor to further work to be done within the INTRO project, while the other (the 
Guide Assistant Robot) was developed as an entirely independent study. 
Section 6.1 provides the description of the application of ESHA to the Robot Waiter scenario. Section 
6.2 reviews the work done on the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) application study, and finally 
Section 6.3 reviews the study into a Guide Assistant Robot application. Each section discusses the task 
requirements of the application, the (partial) ESHA exercises that were performed and presents the 
results that were obtained.
6.1 Application Study #1 – The Robot Waiter 
The Robot Waiter scenario described in chapter 4 aims to demonstrate the behaviour of an intelligent 
robotic system that functions in close interaction with humans in a cafe, which is a partially 
unstructured and dynamically changing environment. 
In this scenario, characteristics such as autonomy, an intelligent interface, high-level sensing abilities, a 
safe manipulator arm, visual pattern recognition and knowledge extraction in order to learn about the 
robot’s environment, are key to achieve an efficient human-robot interaction and cooperation.
During the September 2011 INTRO Workshop, held at Bristol Robotics Laboratory (BRL), a trial of 
Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis (ESHA) was conducted for the first time with participants 
other than the authors. The general aim of the overall process is to merge the results of ESHA with the 
aforementioned Hazard Analysis results. The traditional Hazard Analysis would take care of the 
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potential hazards in mission tasks caused during a system’s operation in its environment, while the 
Environmental Survey would identify the non-mission aspects of extended operation. 
In the practice session, a four-person group applied an especially drafted form for ESHA. After the 
tutorial a discussion session was conducted in order to collect the participants’ opinions on the 
usefulness of the approach. The practice session lasted less than 2 hours, so the quantity of work 
achieved was small, but enough to offer an initial impression of the approach. A sample from the 
ESHA worksheet produced by this study group is shown in Table 9.
The Robot Waiter scenario was the same as the one described in chapter 4, however, the way the same 
scenario was approached this time is different since in chapter 4, only the mission tasks were 
considered, as it happens for a traditional Hazard Analysis, while during these trials the new ESHA was 
applied to the Robot Waiter scenario, thus all non-mission aspects and the environment where the robot 
operates were taken into account. 
The analysis was effective since participants were able to go over multiple possible hazard scenarios 
involving the robot and environmental elements. The safety requirements identified for both the robot 
and the environment were numerous, and it was clear that many more could have been made during a 
longer trial.
However, the participants commented that better guidance is needed in the order to ensure that each 
row of the hazard analysis table must be filled. The possible resulting confusion increases the chance 
that parts of the analysis may be overlooked. During the trial, in order to complete the survey, guidance 
from the authors was necessary. In addition, the “Interaction Failure Details” column in the ESHA 
form was not taken in consideration by the participants, who would find that field hard to fill. 
Furthermore, it was necessary to explain that the “Interaction Details” column refers to normal 
operational times. These comments will be considered as the guidelines for a future revision of the 
ESHA methodology (see Section 7.2).
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Table 9: Fragment from Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis Worksheet – INTRO Project 3rd Workshop – Robot Waiter demonstrator
Ref. 
No.
Object:
Environment 
Interaction Details Interaction 
Failure 
Type/keyword
Interaction 
Failure 
Details
Consequence Safety Measures
Water, liquid or broken glasses
on the 
Floor 
Doorstep
Moving on the floor
Go past doorstep without 
problems
Slipping
Losing your point 
in space
Robot falling
For odometry 
in navigation
The robot could fall over: 
hazard
Inaccurate localization: loss of 
function 
Hitting people: hazard
Damage property: damage
Robot sensors could get 
damaged and that could later 
become an hazard
Travel slowly, sensor that can detect 
irregularities on the floor coupled with a 
system that can avoid them
When the robot stops then it must always 
recalibrate, sensor that can detect 
irregularities on the floor coupled with a 
system that can avoid them
Set up an environment without small steps
Include in the robot design a sensor that 
points at the floor
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6.2 Application Study #2 – Urban Search and Rescue Application
In the USAR scenario, the aim is to detect and uncover surface and lightly trapped victims. “Surface” 
victims are visible and mostly free to move and “Lightly” trapped ones are partially covered by light 
and small pieces of rubble. The first phase of rescue response, after setting coordinating command 
centre up, is reconnaissance of affected region to identify cold, warm and hot zone. The INTRO USAR 
scenario considers human robot collaboration in this phase. Using rescue robots in this phase helps to 
speed up the search for victim and reduces risks that the human rescuers are exposed to. Additionally, 
robots can assist in uncovering lightly trapped victims. The search for victims is shared between a 
human rescuer and an assistant mobile robot. The robot will cooperate with the human in assisting both 
with the visual detection and the extraction of victims by clearing away the rubble which is trapping 
them. 
The robotic system will include a mobile platform fit for unstructured environments and a standard 6 
degree of freedom manipulator. In the USAR scenario, a mobile robot assistant has three main 
requirements:  mobility, manipulation and sensing. Mobility is ensured by the mobile outdoor platform 
base which is also capable of powering the auxiliary hardware installed on it. Simple manipulation 
tasks such as pick and place of small and light objects are provided by the manipulator. The sensors 
positioned on the base include rangers for navigation so that the human-robot team can navigate the 
ruins in search of victims to extract. A stereo vision camera is also employed for HRI and victim 
detection.
6.2.1 Application Specification
The scenario comprises multiple tasks. The robot searches the disaster environment controlled by tele-
operation. During exploration, visual saliency detection is continuously employed to look for victims’ 
faces and/or movement. In case of a successful detection, the robotic manipulator is pointed in the 
direction of the victim to inform the rescue worker of the victim’s approximate position.  At this point, 
the following robot action depends on the intention recognition cues. Depending on the rescuer’s cue, 
the robot has two possible behaviours. In the case where the rescue worker picks up a piece of rubble 
and offers it to the robot, the rescuer is indicating to the robot that it must pick up the rubble and 
deposit it to a suitable place. Then, the robot will get ready to pick up another piece. The robot acts 
autonomously during this collaboration.
On the contrary, if the human directs the robot with a pointing gesture then the robot independently 
begins clearing out an area of the rubble. At this point, the robot continues moving the rubble until the 
victim is free. The robot continues finding and extracting victims until the end of the mission. The 
state-chart of this scenario is depicted in the Figure 5.
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Figure 5: USAR Robot task model
6.2.2 Results of SAR Robot Hazard Analysis
At the September 2011 INTRO workshop at BRL a tutorial session on ESHA was held, to introduce the 
INTRO project researchers to the proposed method and to conduct an initial trial that would provide 
feedback on the usability of the technique. It must be noted that this workshop took place early in the 
demonstrator project, and the analysis was not performed on the design model illustrated in Figure 5, 
which represents a later stage of development. The ESHA worksheet that was developed for the USAR 
Robot demonstrator in the workshop tutorial is presented in 
Table 10 and its accompanying notes.
Since the session was a tutorial and the first time that the participants had received any training in 
hazard analysis, the study group that produced the worksheet did not develop the worksheet precisely 
as intended in the checklist procedure. Improvement of the checklist guidelines has been identified as 
an area for further development (see Section 7.1). However, the general feedback from the participants 
was that the method encouraged them to consider issues that they might not have done before, and the 
worksheet and its notes show that in the limited time available the study group was beginning to 
identify aspects of the robot’s interaction with its environment and the consequent non-mission 
interactions.
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Table 10: Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis Worksheet – INTRO Project 3rd Workshop 
Tutorial – USAR Robot Example
Object:
(Environment 
Feature / Obstacle /
Agent)
Interaction 
Details
Interaction Failure 
Type/keyword
Interaction 
Failure Details
Consequence Safety Measures
Burning rooms Approach
Detect fire
Detect people
Notify/warn
Failure to interact
Too little interaction
Too much 
interaction
Failure to interact
Don’t find the fire
Don’t move close 
enough
Moves into fire
Fails to detect a 
fire
Injury
Damage to robot
Injury
Injury
Damage to robot
Injury
Damage to robot
Fails to warn fire-
fighters
Inherent –
temperature 
measurement
Inherent – make 
robot fire proof
User training 
Edge to vertical 
drop
Avoid Failure to interact Drives over drop Injury to people below 
the drop
Damage to robot
Terrain scanning
Sensors mounted 
high up on the 
robot
Diverse scanning 
with sonar, 
vision, laser, 
sound, etc.
Inherent: hooks 
on the back of the 
robot that can 
grab the surface 
and avoid a fall
Inherent: 
Explosive bolt at 
the back that 
secures the robot 
and avoids a fall
Inherent: Long 
robot with large 
mass in the 
centre to avoid it 
from falling even 
if it passes over 
an edge
Notes:
Circumstances
Collapsed building meaning that path planning from old drawings isn’t possible.
Wheeled robot with single manipulator
Fire in the building
There is a human present to cooperate with the robot
The robot can lift approximately 7 kg
The robot can push things
The robot can do reconnaissance
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Analysis of environmental features
Specific areas
Interior: rooms (possibly broken), corridor (possibly broken), stairs (possibly broken), rubble
Exterior: rubble, streets, garden, 
Types of terrain surface
Floor, stairs, rubble
Types of terrain features
Rough, damaged, uneven, cracks, water, mud, gravel
Ambient conditions
Daylight outside and dark inside, sharp contrasts, any kind of light, outside temperature, smoke and fire
Analysis of obstacles and simple objects
Point-like obstacles
Fire, exposed electrical cable
Linear obstacles
Stairs, edge to a vertical drop, cables, cracks in the floor
Surface obstacles
Collapsed flat objects
6.3 Application Study #3 – Guide Assistant Robot Application
The third application study of ESHA was an MSc dissertation project carried out by one of the authors 
at BRL in 2012 (Choung 2012). The dissertation was a study on the requirements of a guide robot for 
elderly persons, in which a task analysis was performed to identify the mission tasks required of the 
robot, and the ESHA technique was used to identify robot hazards and the safety requirements and non-
mission tasks necessary to mitigate their risks.
6.3.1 Application Specification
The basic functional requirement of the Guide Robot was developed as a task model using Hierarchical 
Task Analysis as the requirements capture method. This produced the task diagram shown in Figure 6, 
which is presented in tabular form in Table 11.
The Guide Robot’s complete functionality is described by its top level Task 0 “Guide the elderly to the 
destination”. The robot performs this task by means of four sub-tasks: “Waiting for user’s call”, 
“Getting user’s requirement”, “Escorting the user to the destination” and “Finishing the journey”. 
Further subdivisions of these tasks are described in Table 11. The task analysis only considered 
essential sub-tasks to achieve top level task and assumed some of the potential error situations that may 
occur in performing this scenario. 
The nominal mission of the Guide Robot is as follows: the robot is intended to remain stationary at a 
pre-determined standby location, and continuously scan for calls from prospective users of the robot, 
and when a call is detected or received to go to that user. Once called by a given user, the robot will not 
be able to accept any other call until the conditions arise where the mission is complete. By returning to 
a standby location, the robot ensures that it does not block the environment by waiting at the location 
where its last mission ended. User interactions such as asking a question or getting a user’s request are 
intended to be done by means of a touch screen, or by gesture or speech recognition. 
36
It is assumed that the robot has a built in map of the operating environment (a care home for the 
elderly) which provides pre-planned paths for given destinations, allowing the robot to plan a journey 
automatically after confirming the destination from the user.
Escorting and guiding a user to a destination requires the robot to move carefully so as to maintain pace 
with the user, who may well not be able to move fast, and particular stages of the journey (especially at 
the start and end) may require the robot to announce its intentions so that the user is not confused about 
the robot’s intended behaviour. It is intended that the user places a hand on top of the robot while 
moving so that the robot can use touch/pressure sensors to detect that it is in pace with the user or when 
the user leaves the robot (intentionally or unintentionally). As the robot moves it guides the user around 
obstacles as well as following the planned path.
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Table 11: Guide Robot Task Descriptions
TASK NAME TASK DESCRIPTION TASK PLAN (S)
0 Guide the elderly to the destination PLAN 0:
 Normal sequence: 1-2-3-4
└ 1 Wait for user’s call
└ 1.1 Go to standby location
└ 1.2 Read the user’s call
└ 1.3 Move to the user
Remain stationary and look for a user’s call
└ Go to standby location and wait there
└ Receive and match signal or sign from user (speech or button to call robot)
└ Approach user close enough to get user’s request within safety distance
PLAN 1:
 Normal sequence: 1.1-1.2-1.3
└ 2 Get the user’s requirement
└ 2.1 Ask the destination
└ 2.2 Read the user’s command
Obtain an order for the destination of user
└ Interact with user to obtain user’s requirement
└ Receive and confirm the destination from user interface or speech
PLAN 2:
 Normal sequence: 2.1-2.2
└ 3 Escort the user to the destination
└ 3.1 Wait for starting command
└ 3.2 Announce the journey
└ 3.3 Start to move
└ 3.4 Move to the destination
└ 3.4.1 Scan the planned path
└ 3.4.2 Detect irremovable 
obstacle
└ 3.4.3 Identify the right path
└ 3.4.4 Follow the path
└ 3.4.5 Check the user’s 
following
└ 3.5 Maintain the distance with user
Guide user until reaching the destination
└ look for user’s starting command (speech and touch on top of robot)
└ Notice the journey to user using voice
└ Start to move with user
└ Go to the destination with user
└ Scan the planned path
└ Interact with environment to find irremovable obstacle within range of 
sensor
└ Confirm the right path
└ Move along the right path
└ Monitor user’s following during the journey using touch sensor
└ Move with estimated walking speed of user
PLAN 3:
 Normal sequence: 
o 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4
o 3.5 executes in parallel to normal 
sequence
PLAN 3.4:
 Normal sequence:
o 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4
o 3.4.5 executes in parallel to normal 
sequence
└ 4 Finish the journey
└ 4.1 Announce the end of journey
└ 4.2 Stop moving
Finish the journey if robot arrive the destination
└ Announce the end of journey to user to recognize the destination
└ Stop moving slowly in order to allow user that is able to stop their following
PLAN 4:
 Normal sequence: 4.1-4.2
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0.   Guide the elderly to the 
destination 
1. Wait for 
user's call 
2. Get the user's 
requirement 
3. Escort the user to 
the destination 
4. Finish the 
journey 
1.1    Go to 
standby 
location 
1.2 Read the 
user's call 
1.3 Move to the 
user 
2.1 Ask the 
destination 
2.2 Read the 
user's command 
- speech 
- touch screen 
3.2 
Announce 
the journey 
3.3 Start to 
move 
3.1 Wait for 
starting 
command 
3.4 Move to 
the 
destination 
3.5 Maintain 
the distance 
with user 
2.1 Ask the 
destination 
2.2 Read the 
user's command 
- speech 
- touch screen 
3.4.2 Detect 
irremovable 
obstacle 
3.4.3  
Identify the 
right path 
3.4.1 Scan 
the way 
3.4.4 Follow 
the path 
3.4.5 Check 
the user's 
following 
Plan0: 
Normal Sequence: 1-2-3-4 
Plan1:
Normal sequence:    1.1-1.2-1.3 
Plan2: 
Normal sequence:   2.1-2.2 
Plan3:
Normal sequence:   3.1-3.2-3.3-3.4 
3.5 run in parallel to normal sequence
Plan4:
Normal sequence:  4.1-4.2 
Plan3.4: 
Normal sequence:   3.4.1-3.4.2-3.4.3-3.4.4
3.4.5 run in parallel to normal sequence
Figure 6: Guide Robot Hierarchical Task Diagram
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6.3.2 Results of PC Robot Hazard Analysis
Having completed a basic task specification using HTA, the design was subjected to a preliminary hazard 
identification analysis using the ESHA technique. However it should be noted that for reasons of practicality 
this list was developed by the research student as a ‘brainstorming’ exercise, not by conducting a physical on-
site survey of a care home. Therefore, while it was sufficient to develop design and simulation models for the 
purposes of a student dissertation, it should not be seen as sufficiently or reasonably foreseeably complete for 
the purposes of a commercial product without being supported by such a direct survey of a target environment. 
However, the exercise was sufficient to allow an initial overview of the practicability of the ESHA method.
Following the guidelines described in Section 5, a list of Environmental Features, Obstacles/Simple Objects, 
and Agents to be found in a care home was drawn up by the research student. This list is shown in 
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. Some of the items in the list were used to develop a set of ESHA worksheets, in which the potentially harmful 
interactions with those items were identified and a set of safety measures were identified that could reduce their 
risk (i.e. reduce their severity or probability). A sample of these worksheets is provided in Table 13, and the full 
set that was developed in the MSc Dissertation is included in an Extension 6 to this paper.
The safety measures in Table 13 and the ESHA worksheets were classified into Inherent safety measures, 
Safeguards and protective mechanisms, and Instructions to users. This is consistent with the practice of the risk 
reduction methodologies underlying international standards for industrial and service robots (ISO 10218, 
ISO/FDIS 13482). Inherent safety measures are passive constraints or built-in properties of the robot that ensure 
that an environmental interaction does not cause harm, such as limitation of motor power or use of soft 
materials. Safeguards and protection mechanisms are active functions of the robot that take positive action to 
prevent hazards occurring, for example speed controllers for robot wheelbases or force controller for 
manipulators. Instructions in the user manuals and guidance notes for users are sometimes required as safety 
measures when no inherent or safeguard measure can be provided, warning the user to take certain actions in 
order to avoid possible hazards, for example warnings about when to apply the emergency stop button. Table 13
shows how ESHA can be used to develop safety requirements in a manner consistent with those already found 
in industry standards. We consider this to be useful in assisting the production of coherent safety requirements 
specifications for robots.
Although only a partial set of ESHA worksheets were developed in this MSc study, they provide a clear 
illustration of how the method is to be applied, and these results are currently the most extensive application of 
the method to date. The results do show the derivation of safety requirements from a systematic review of 
environmental interactions regardless of their status as mission or non-mission tasks. Therefore, while details 
such as the ESHA keyword sets may continue to evolve in the future to improve their applicability and 
coverage, it is clear that an analysis process of this format is able to fulfil the objective of providing a non-
mission based perspective on the behaviour of a robot.
The main limitation of this study was the fact that it was the work of a single student and not a design team
including domain experts, which is the recommended practice in industry for conducting for system hazard 
analyses and remains equally valid for ESHA (although several analysis sessions were conducted with a group 
of student colleagues and supervisors). This limitation can be seen in a close inspection of the ESHA 
worksheets, where some of the entries appear to be based on assumptions that a domain expert might challenge. 
However, this limitation was inherent in the structure of the project. The issue of provision of domain expertise 
is discussed further in Section 7.1.
Table 12: Examples of environment features
Environment feature
Specific areas Bedroom, Bathroom, Living room, Care home common room, Kitchen, 
Storage room, Corridors, Lifts/Elevators, Staircase
Terrain surfaces Carpeted surface, Smooth/polished tile floor, Wooden flooring (smooth, 
varnished)
Terrain features Walls, Doors (sliding door, normal door, automatic doors, rolling shutter, 
saloon doors), Windows (full height windows only), Mirrors (full-height 
mirror, smaller mirrors)
Ambient conditions Natural light conditions, Artificial light conditions (approximate sunlight 
(broad spectrum of colours), monochromatic light), Directed / diffuse light 
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source, Air temperature (Room temperature(≈ 20C), Hot conditions (≥ 40C), 
Cold conditions (≈ 5C)), Water/moisture conditions (Fire sprinklers, Fluids 
spilt on robot (e.g. drinks), Water on floor, Humidity), Wind / air currents 
(e.g. through open window), Leaking gas, Salt atmosphere (near coasts)
Environment obstacles and simple objects
Point obstacles Media Centre / Speakers, Lights & Lamps, Cookers (chemical/odour source), 
Vacuum cleaners (noise source), Washing machines (noise source)
Linear obstacles Floor surface area edges (carpet edges, tile floor edges), Vertical furniture 
items (lamps, potted plants, loudspeakers, coat stands, ceramic vases), Cables 
for portable appliances, Doorsteps or small steps, Edges of staircases, Edges 
of holes
Surface obstacles Pictures & ornaments on walls, Television screens, Water spilt on the floor, 
Spilt beads/marbles/balls on floor, Detergent (or other slippery surface) on 
floor, Thick/soft carpets (which are hard to drive over), Recently cleaned 
surfaces marked by signs, Manholes & trapdoors, Food spilt on floor, Clutter 
on floor (papers, plastic bags, other objects left on the floor)
Volumetric obstacles Large furniture (large tables, heavy chairs, bookcases, shelves, other large 
furniture items, appliances, beds, sofas), Portable items (walking sticks, clutter 
on the floor), Smaller chairs/tables, Wheeled objects (wheelchairs, trolleys, 
suitcases, appliances, items mounted on wheeled stands), Movable 
signs/barriers, Balls/toys, Trolleys/stretchers, Moving decorations, Moving 
ventilation fans, Waste bins, Things falling off tables
Agents
Customer User (attention level, native language, vision, hearing impairment, balance, 
speech impairment, gesture/manipulation impairment (i.e. can't keep steady 
hand on top of the robot), walking speed)
Animals Pets (cats, dogs, birds, rabbits, guide dogs, exotic animals)
Humans Other people:care home residents (with varying attention level, native 
language, vision/hearing impairment, walking speed, position: seated/lying 
down/standing-), cleaners, visitors, care workers, security, supervisors,
medical personnel (walking/running speed, attention level), people in 
wheelchairs, people on stretchers, children ((in-)attention level, 
walking/running speed, size, position: seated/lying down/standing, non-
malicious but deliberate misuse (i.e. playing with the robot)
Autonomous systems or 
unintelligent systems
Other robots: cleaning robots, other guide robots,,robot pets (entertainment 
robots), mobile domestic servant robots, medical robots, semi-autonomous 
wheelchairs
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Table 13: Analysis of one specific feature - staircase
Ref. 
No.
Object:
(Environment 
Feature/Obstacle/Agent)
Interaction Details Interaction Failure 
Type/keyword
Interaction Failure Details Consequence Safety Measures
1 Staircase Wheeled robot - cannot 
climb stairs.
Robot fails to notice 
stairs
Robot try to go forward;
Robot recognize stairs as 
wall;
Robot drops on 
the way 
downstairs;
Robot damaged 
by dropping;
Property 
damaged;
Robot damaged 
by edge of stair;
Robot Hits user;
Robot falls 
down;
People damaged 
from running 
wheel (burning) 
because of 
robot’s running 
on same 
position;
Robot avoids 
stairs but moves 
around stairs;
 Inherent safety measure
o Use of inherently safe 
materials in the robot’s 
wheel;
o Design robot’s height 
higher than stair;
o Set up a care home 
without stairs;
o Put caution sign about 
stair on wall near stair;
o Set up a baby gate on 
beginning of stairs;
o Set up a soft cover on 
edge of stairs;
 Safeguards or protective 
devices
o Protective stop function 
triggered by robot ;
o Use of touch 
sensor/bumper on bottom 
of robot to recognize hit 
from stair;
o Use of compass sensor to 
recognize robot falling;
o Include in the robot 
design a sensor that 
points at the floor;
o Terrain scanning sensors 
mounted on ;robot to 
recognize;
 Instructions to robot users
o Training user to notice 
that robot cannot climb 
stairs;
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7 Discussion
In this section we discuss the themes emerging from all the application studies taken as a complete set, i.e. 
comments on the effectiveness of the ESHA methodology.
7.1 Findings from the INTRO & BRL Experiments
The tutorial session on hazard analysis, which was held at the 3rd INTRO project Workshop at BRL in 2011, 
was the first trial of the ESHA method. Details of the results of the tutorial are provided in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
There were two specific comments arising from this first trial of the ESHA method, which will be taken into 
consideration when refining the methodology in the future:
1. Although the intent of ESHA is that the hazard analysis process should not be biased by the mission 
specification, in practice it is still necessary to provide some contextual information on what general 
tasks the autonomous system is expected to be doing, if only to allow the relevant environmental 
situations to be identified in which non-mission interactions might occur. Therefore, it is still necessary 
to consider the mission in terms of its generalized scenarios as background information to the analysis.
2. Better guidance is needed on the order in which the tables should be completed. The guidelines were 
insufficiently clear about the need to ensure that each row of the hazard analysis table is complete 
before moving on to the next one. As a result, one of the sessions became a little chaotic in the way in 
which the table was completed, and it was noted that this increased the possibility that parts of the
analysis may be overlooked. The comment was raised that the wording of the guidelines should be 
revised to make the procedure more prescriptive in the way in which the analysis steps were to be 
followed. This will be considered as the guidelines are revised in the light of further practice and 
experience.
The Guide Robot and the design study was the second phase of trials of the ESHA method, by which time more 
experience in applying the methods had been gained. This study showed that the general method appears to be 
feasible, although the major lesson learned at this stage was that like other more established variants of hazard 
analysis, ESHA requires a team with good domain knowledge in order to produce an analysis with good 
confidence that all reasonably foreseeable hazards have been identified. While the analysis of the Guide Robot 
could proceed because this type of robot is operated in domestic environments, for which most people have 
good domain experience by default, this issue was a particular problem with some of the work on the USAR 
Robot problem, where there was difficulty in applying the ESHA method because none of the researchers or 
supervisors had sufficient experience with search and rescue operations to form a confident opinion about the 
identification of hazards.
7.2 Improvements to Environmental Survey Hazard Analysis
Given the experience of the trials described in Section 6 and the conclusions presented in Section 7.1, we 
consider the following improvements of the ESHA to be needed for 
 Refinements to the ESHA guidewords, to offer more usable guidance.
 Refinements to the ESHA checklist/procedure, to clarify how the ESHA worksheet tables should be 
completed and the order in which the work should be done.
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 Development of further guidance on the composition of the analysis team and the need for persons with 
suitable domain knowledge or experience to participate in the process.
8 Conclusions
In this section, we discuss some of the wider issues raised by this research. 
8.1 Implications for Industry Safety Standards in the Robotics Sector
Once this work gains maturity and is more widely practised and accepted, it may form a valuable tool 
complementing the use of robotics industry safety standards. We hope that the general principle can be written 
into future versions of standards such as ISO 13482 that the preliminary hazard analysis stage of any robot 
development project should include an environmental assessment intended to identify non-mission interactions.
8.2 Requirements for Online Hazard Analysis in Advanced Robots
Although we believe ESHA to provide a useful basis for preliminary hazard analysis by human designers of 
robots, there are limits to what can be achieved during the design stage. We believe the method will be able to 
support the claim that human designers have taken all reasonably foreseeable steps to identify hazards for 
relatively simple robots, which perform only a few tasks in environments that are predictable in advance of the 
robot’s entry into service (such as the initial generation of robots anticipated in the development of the industry 
safety standard ISO 13482). However, as the number of required mission tasks and the required number of 
operating environments grows, the number of potential non-mission interactions will grow rapidly, making the 
task of identifying all such interactions by hand prohibitively expensive, and for more sophisticated robots 
designers will not credibly be able to make the above claims.
Although an ESHA-style preliminary hazard analysis will still be a useful tool in specifying safety functions for 
an initial set of non-mission interactions, a truly dependable robot will need to be capable of identifying new 
environmental features online and developing the relevant safety functions to maintain safety in the new non-
mission interactions. This may well entail the use of adaptive and learning mechanisms configured to the 
identification of novel environmental features, and for the provision of behavioural capabilities for investigating 
such features and for assessing the safety of the resultant interactions. 
Novelty detection and task acquisition is an on-going field of research in robotics, for example, Nehmzow 
(1995, 2004), Bonasso & Kortenkamp (1996) or Larsen & Hansen (2005). Many such methods may be useable 
for the purpose of online hazard analysis. It may be useful to provide these mechanisms with information 
structures (knowledge bases, semantic networks, or similar) that encode the ESHA guidewords classification 
scheme, to ensure that the robot develops an analysis that is an extension of the initial human analysis done at 
design time. We aim to investigate this idea in future work.
8.3 Future Work
Future work in this area of research is likely to proceed in the following directions:
 The current experiments and trials have tended to focus on wheeled robots used in urban or domestic 
environments. We are interested in applying ESHA to different domains and applications of robotics, 
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such as UAVs and AUVs, remote manipulation / tele-robotics in medicine, space and other 
environments. This will be useful in developing and adapting the guide words for ESHA, which may at 
the present time contain biases towards the applications we have considered so far.
 To date we have taken a breadth-first approach to our application trials, by studying as many different 
applications as practicable in the time and opportunities available, but to a relatively shallow 
(incomplete) extent. We did this to get as early an understanding as possible of the relevance and 
validity of the proposed ESHA guideword set and classification scheme. In future work, we propose to 
develop an in-depth, full and complete ESHA on an application; this will evaluate explicitly our claim 
that the method is comprehensive enough to claim that all reasonably foreseeable hazards can be 
identified for a given environment.
 Other safety analysis methods may be useful for the analysis of robotic systems. In particular, a 
relatively new hazard analysis methodology called STAMP (Owens, 2007) shows promise as it may 
also be usable as an externally focused analysis that may also offer a method of identifying non-
mission interactions. We are interested in investigating this method in future case studies.
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Annex A Hierarchical Task Analysis
The highest level of abstraction in the functional specification of a system is to model the system as a single 
element (often called a ‘black box’ specification) and to define its interaction with the environment. Typically, 
this requires a specification of the tasks to be performed by the system, from the viewpoint of external 
observers, agents or stakeholders.  Many methods exist for specifying the externally-observed functionality of a 
system, including Use Case Design, User Stories, and Viewpoints-based Requirements Engineering. However, 
for the BRL Robot Waiter design study, a method called Hierarchical Task Analysis was used.
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992) is a system analysis method that has been 
developed by the Human Factors Analysis community as a method for eliciting the procedures and action 
sequences by which a system is used by human operators. System and procedural models identified by HTA are 
then used as the basis for operator error analyses to determine whether the system functional or user interface 
design has an increased potential for of hazards due to human error.
In addition to its use as a methodology for Human Factors analysis, HTA may also be useful as a design 
technique for mobile robots and other intelligent autonomous systems. The tasks identified within HTA are 
descriptions of the externally-viewed behaviour required of a robot, which strongly resemble the task modules 
or behaviour modules developed in many system architectures used widely within the mobile robotics domain
(behaviour based architectures). Furthermore, the hierarchical organisation of tasks produced by HTA also 
resembles the layered hierarchies of tasks that typical of many behaviour-based architectural schemes, such as 
Subsumption Architecture (Brooks, 1999).
Therefore, it is hypothesized that HTA might be a useful candidate for a high level system requirements 
elicitation technique, generating behavioural (task-based) models of the functionality required of an autonomous 
robot and identifying their relative hierarchical ordering, without making assumptions about the manner of their 
implementation. This enhances the utility of HTA as a requirements technique, as it provides maximum freedom 
of choice to designers in the selection of implementation schemes.
HTA proceeds by the identification of the tasks required of the system, and identification of plans, which 
describe the order in which tasks are to be performed. Tasks are described by the general activity to be 
performed and/or the desired end state of the system and its environment at the end of the activity. Each task is 
then successively decomposed into sub-tasks by the same procedure, as far as is reasonable for the purpose of 
the analysis. Each task is accompanied by its own plan specifying the ordering of the sub-tasks. The results can 
also be used in the construction of a hierarchical task diagram that presents the organisational structure of the 
tasks in a graphical format. An example HTA task diagram is shown in Figure 7.
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0: Deliver ordered drinks to 
customer
1: Wait for new 
customer 2: Get Order 3: Get Drink
4: Deliver 
Drink
5: Resolve 
customer 
satisfaction
6: Resolve missing / 
unavailable drink
7: Resolve 
missing 
customer
PLAN 0:
Normal sequence: 1,2,3,4
If (DRINK_UNAVAILABLE): do 6
If (DRINK_RESTORED): do 4
If (CANCELLATION_HAS_BEEN_EXPLAINED): do 2
If (DELIVERY_FAILED): do 7
If (CUSTOMER_FOUND): do 4 with a new customer location
1.1: Go to 
standby 
location
1.2: 
Scan 
room
1.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 1
3.1: Go to 
drink 
location
3.2: Pick 
up drink
Plan 3
4.1: Go to 
standby 
location
4.2: 
Scan 
room
4.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 4
5.1: Ask 
satisfaction 
question
Plan 5
5.2: Handle 
customer 
choice
5.3: Take drink 
back from 
customer
5.4: Take 
drink back 
to bar
4.1: Go to 
standby 
location
4.2: 
Scan 
room
4.3: Indicate 
recognition
Plan 4
Figure 7: Partial Hierarchical Task Diagram example for BRL Robot Waiter design study
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The tasks are numbered hierarchically (1, 2.1, 3.2.1, etc.) according to its layer of decomposition, and their 
associated task plans take the same number.
Each task plan is described in a standard format:
 The normal sequence, which describes the intended sequence of execution of the principal sub-tasks 
necessary to achieve the objective of the task under nominal environmental circumstances.
 Alternate sequencesmay be defined for the sub-tasks, which cater for specific circumstances which may 
occur but are not considered to be handled by the normal sequence. Typically alternate sequences will be 
triggered by changes in the environmental conditions that initiated the normal sequence, which obviate that 
sequence and require further activity to restore the robot and its environment to a nominal state. To take an 
example from the BRL Robot Waiter study, if a customer leaves the café while the robot is fetching the 
drink they ordered, then the robot must return the ordered drink to the bar before returning to its waiting 
location. The sequence “return drink” and “return to waiting location” form an alternate sequence to the 
normal sequence for delivering the ordered drink. Other candidate alternate sequences might include 
emergency actions, fail-safe actions, or user-choice actions.
In addition to hierarchical task diagrams, an alternative tabular format for presenting the task structure is shown 
in Table 14. This table shows an extension to the tabular format that was added in the BRL Robot Waiter design 
study, where for each task the behaviour type was identified as defined in the NASA Goddard Agent reference 
model. This was done to facilitate the development of a functional architecture model on top of the basic task 
specification. This is described in Annex B.
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Table 14: BRL Robot Waiter Hierarchical Task Analysis Results
TASK NAME TASK DESCRIPTION BEHAVIOUR TYPE TASK PLAN(S)
0 Deliver Ordered Drink to Customer [mixed] PLAN 0:
 Normal sequence: 1,2,3,4,5
 If (DRINK_UNAVAILABLE): do 6
 If 
(CANCELLATION_HAS_BEEN_EXPLAINED)
: do 1
 If (DELIVERY_FAILED): do 7
 If (CUSTOMER_FOUND): do 4 with new 
customer location
└ 1 Wait for new customer Remain stationary and look for a new customer [mixed] PLAN 1:
Normal sequence: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3└ 1.1 Go to standby location └ Go to standby location and wait there [reactive]
└ 1.2 Scan room └ Scan room to look for a customer attentional gesture [reactive]2
└ 1.3 Indicate recognition └ Indicate recognition of the attentional gesture to customer [social]
└ 2 Get Order Obtain an order for a drink [mixed] PLAN 2:
Normal sequence: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3└ 2.2 Attend Customer └ Approach customer close enough to allow use of user interface [reactive]
└ 2.3 Take Order └ Interact with customer to obtain the drink order [social] PLAN 2.3:
Normal sequence: 2.3.1, 2.3.2└ 2.3.1 Receive Order └ Receive order via user interface [social]
└ 2.3.2 Confirm Order └ Ask customer to confirm that the order is correct [social]
└ 3 Get Drink Go to the bar area and obtain the drink [mixed] PLAN 3:
 Normal sequence: 3.1, 3.2
 If no drink at location: 
(DRINK_UNAVAILABLE)
└ 3.1 Go to Drink Location └ Move to the bar location where the requested type of drink is supplied [reactive]
└ 3.2 Pick Up Drink └ Pick up one example of the requested type of drink [reactive]
└ 4 Deliver Drink Deliver drink to customer [mixed] PLAN 4:
Normal sequence: 4.1, 4.2, 4.3
 If no customer at original location: 
(DELIVERY_FAILED)
└ 4.1 Approach Customer └ Carry drink to customer location [reactive]
└ 4.2 Engage Customer └ Interact with customer to obtain permission to serve drink and mode of 
service [mixed]
└ 4.2.1 Get customer attention └ Attract customer attention with a sign [social] PLAN 4.2:
Normal sequence: 4.2.1, 4.3.2; 4.2.3└ 4.2.2 Detect customer recognition └ Scan customer for sign of recognition [social]
└ 4.2.3 Request mode of service └ Ask customer for service mode (on table or hand-to-hand) [social]
└ 4.3 Serve Drink to Customer └ Serve drink to customer by requested mode [reactive]
└ 5 Resolve Customer Satisfaction Ask customer if order is satisfactory and resolve any complaints [mixed] PLAN 5:
Normal sequence: 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4
 If customer requests replacement drink do 3
 If customer requests new drinks order do 2
└ 5.1 Ask satisfaction question └ Ask customer for Yes/No answer on their satisfaction [social]
└ 5.2 Handle customer choice └ Offer customer choice of action [social]
└ 5.3 Take drink back from customer └ Pick up drink from table or from customer's hand [reactive]
└ 5.4 Take drink back to bar └ Return unwanted drink to bar (to returns area) [reactive]
2 Note: this task could be considered proactive, in that the robot could be considered to proactively scan the environment for new customers.
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TASK NAME TASK DESCRIPTION BEHAVIOUR TYPE TASK PLAN(S)
└ 6 Resolve Missing/Unavailable Drink Find out why drink is unavailable and report back to customer [mixed] PLAN 6:
 Normal sequence: 6.1, then CHOICE: 
□ If drink is delayed then do 6.2 then do 2;
□ If no drinks left then do 6.3
└ 6.1 Notify bartender └ Notify bartender that there is no drink [social]
└ 6.2 Wait for new drink └ Wait fixed time for a new drink to be supplied [reactive]
└ 6.3 Return to customer └ Return to customer, explain reason, and take new order if requested [mixed] PLAN 6.3:
Normal sequence: 6.3.1, 6.3.2
At end of 6.3.2: 
(CANCELLATION_HAS_BEEN_EX
PLAINED)
If no customer at end of 6.3.1 then do 1
└ 6.3.1 Return to customer location └ Go back to original location of customer [reactive]
└ 6.3.2 Explain reason └ Explain reason for unavailable drink [social]
└ 7 Resolve Missing Customer Search for missing customer and/or take undelivered drink back to bar [mixed] PLAN 7:
 Normal sequence: 7.1, 7.2 then do 1
 If customer is recognised during 7.1 time period: 
(CUSTOMER_FOUND)
└ 7.1 Do local search └ Search for customer within table area for fixed time period
[reactive]
└ 7.2 Take drink back to bar └ Return unwanted drink to bar (to returns area) [identical to 5.4] [reactive]
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Annex B Use of the NASA Goddard Reference Architecture as a System Model
In the BRL Robot Waiter experiment, we decided to use the NASA Goddard Agent Architecture 
(Rouff et al. 2006) as a reference model for the robot functional architecture design. This model 
identifies the general nature of the cognitive processing required in order to perform behavioural 
tasks of a given type. The components of the architecture model are shown in Figure 8.
Environment
Agent
Agent
Communications Perceptors Effectors
Execution
AgendaPlanning andScheduling
Agent
Reasoning
Modelling
and State
Reflex
conditions
Percepts
ACL
State info
Plan Steps
Data Data
Plan Step Completion Status
Completion
Status
Steps
Data Data / ActionsMessages
Output
Goals
Figure 8: NASA Goddard Agent Architecture Reference Model.
The architecture model identifies a number of cognitive processes that must be present within an 
autonomous agent if it is to perform various different types of task:
● Perceptors observe the environment and provide signals or indications (percepts) that reflect 
the state or condition of the environment. Perceptors may be more than just a sensor; they may 
include some level of signal processing in order to provide a particular item of information to 
the other cognitive processes of the agent. Perceptors also provide more primitive signals to 
the effectors, for the purposes of performing reflexive behaviour patterns (see later).
● Effectors are the actuators, motors, muscles, or other transducers that act physically upon the 
environment. Effectors may either perform physical activity, or they may provide other forms 
of emission of information, materiel or energy into the environment.
● The Agent Communications process performs explicit message-based communications 
directed specifically to other agents. This is the primary cognitive process associated with 
social behaviour patterns, which involve dialogue rather than just physical actions.
● The Execution process is responsible for deciding upon the specific actions to be taken in 
order to achieve the steps of a given plan (provided by other processes). It can be thought of 
as the lowest level of action planning within the agent. Actions are specified based on the 
action plan and the state of the world as supplied by the Agenda and the Modelling & State 
processes.
● The Modelling and State process provides the storage of all data, information or knowledge 
required by the agent, typically in the form of world models or knowledge bases. In general it 
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is a passive component, merely providing a storage and retrieval service to other processes. 
However, occasionally it may be the source of internally triggered or motivated behaviour 
patterns, if any specific data/information patterns occur within the world model.
● The Agent Reasoning process is the source of all logical inference and reasoning within the 
agent. It encodes the primary goals of the agent, and invokes the necessary deliberative, social 
or reflexive behaviours needed to achieve them. This process is the principal source of 
internally motivated (proactive) behaviour, although other processes may also do so (as 
above).
● The Planning and Scheduling process is responsible for the generation and monitoring of 
action plans that achieve the goals generated by the Agent Reasoning process. This process is 
intended to perform only a high level planning process (management or supervisory), 
selecting from a range of more specific plans, monitoring their completion, and reacting to 
failures with the selection of new plans.
● The Agenda process is responsible for the lower level of planning, identifying the action steps 
required to achieve the high level plans supplied by the Planning & Scheduling Process. It 
passes the individual action steps to the Execution process, monitors their successful 
completion, and then advises the Planning & Scheduling process as to whether a given plan 
has been performed successfully (or otherwise).
The processes shown in Figure 8 define the internal cognitive mechanisms required of an agent. 
The Goddard Agent Architecture Model also identifies a number of different types of behaviour 
pattern that an agent may exhibit:
● Reactive: reasoned action initiated by events in the environment
● Reflexive: fixed/stereotyped action pattern initiated directly by percepts
● Deliberative: reasoned and planned action initiated by external events
● Proactive: action initiated by the agent itself due to internal motivations
● Social: dialogue with other agent(s) which may also trigger action
These basic behaviour types are then extended by consideration of how the behaviour may be 
triggered or initiated, thereby producing a list of eight specific behaviour modes:
1. Reactive 1: triggered by another agent
2. Reactive 2: triggered by a percept
3. Reflexive
4. Deliberative 1: triggered by another agent
5. Deliberative 2: triggered by a percept
6. Proactive
7. Social 1: triggered by another agent
8. Social 2: triggered by the agent itself
The Goddard Agent Architecture Model identifies how the cognitive processes combine to 
perform each behaviour mode by modelling the information flow through the process model. The 
various different information flow archetypes are presented in Figure 9 - Figure 16.
Although the Goddard Agent Architecture reference model is presented as a block diagram 
suggesting that the constituent processes must be thought of as an implementation, it need not be 
interpreted in this way. The model is intended to define the cognitive processes of an agent, not 
necessarily the software processes. There does necessarily need to be a one-to-one correspondence 
between the cognitive processes required of an agent and the software algorithms that are 
programmed into its computational equipment. Instead, the model may be interpreted as a 
statement of the functional requirements for performing behaviours of a given type, which could 
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be implemented by other architectures as appropriate, as long as the cognitive processes necessary 
are allocated to the elements of the implementation architecture.
Thus, it is possible to use the Goddard Agent Architecture Model as a reference model for 
functional requirements for the primitive processes of the task model, to identify the internal 
functionality they require. This can then be used in further design studies such as functional 
hazard/failure analysis, by providing some information about the internal functional processes of 
the system, but still retaining considerable freedom about how the design may be implemented.
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Figure 9: Reflexive Behaviour
Environment
Agent
Communications Perceptors Effectors
Execution
AgendaPlanning andScheduling
Agent
Reasoning
Modelling
and State
Reflex 
actions
Output
Percepts
Agent
Communication
Language
Goals State info
Plan Steps
Data Data
Plan Step Completion Status
Completion 
Status
Steps
Data Data / ActionsMessages
Reactive 1
Figure 10: Reactive 1 Behaviour
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Figure 11: Reactive 2 Behaviour
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Figure 12: Proactive Behaviour
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Figure 13: Deliberative 1 Behaviour
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Figure 14: Deliberative 2 Behaviour
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Figure 15: Social 1 Behaviour
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Note: this type of behaviour could also be considered as a form of proactive behaviour.
Figure 16: Social 2 Behaviour
